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INTRODUCTION
Violence among intimates is a major problem in India, as it is in
the rest of the world including the United States. One common
approach to this problem has been to look to criminal laws. Thus,
womens advocates in both the United States and India have sought
legislative and policy changes that criminalize such violence. In the
United States, violations of civil protective orders are usually criminal
offenses. Many states and localities have adopted policies that call for
1
mandatory arrest of spousal abusers.
Prosecutors offices have
∗
Professor of Law, New England School of Law. I would like to thank Russell
Engler, Ken Greenberg, Manju Parikh, Nirva Kapasi, and Christina Shea for reading
earlier versions of this Article, the New England School of Law for providing financial
assistance for the writing of the Article, Barry Stearns for research assistance at many
crucial moments, and Liz Schneider for her path-breaking and continuing work on
battered women that helped to create a field where none had previously existed.
1. See Linda G. Mills, Killing Her Softly: Intimate Abuse and the Violence of State
Intervention, 113 HARV. L. R EV. 550, 558 (1999) (responding positively to womens
advocates, at least fifteen states and Washington, D.C., have adopted mandatory, or
limited-discretion arrest policies). Mandatory arrest policies were not only a
response to frustration with police officers who trivialized or ignored domestic
violence, but also a means of deterring domestic abusers from committing new acts.
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adopted  no-drop policies that require prosecution of such cases
2
regardless of whether the victim wishes to pursue judicial relief. For
the past several years, some of those most dedicated to improving the
lives of battered women have started criticizing, and even opposing,
this heavy reliance on the criminal system to deal with the problem of
intimate violence.
One criticism of the impact of criminalization in the United States
involves the potential result of benefits to white, middle class women
3
Furthermore,
at the expense of poorer women of color.
criminalization of domestic violence increases the opportunities for
state control over the same women who are routinely marginalized
4
on account of their race, class or immigrant status. Others, claiming
that mandatory state intervention risks replicating the abuse that
victims experienced at the hands of their abusers, have criticized the
reliance on criminal remedies to address the problems of domestic
5
violence; this time however, the abuse is at the hands of the state. All
of these indicate that we, as advocates of victims of intimate abuse,
6
must reassess the reliance currently placed on criminal remedies.
In India, womens advocates succeeded in the 1980s in getting two
important laws passed to make at least some forms of domestic
7
violence criminal. An analysis of how these laws have worked in
Id. at 559.
2. See id. at 561 (explaining that mandatory prosecution is a natural extension
of mandatory arrest and was created to solve the problem of battered womens
reluctance to testify against their batterers).
3. See Janell D. Schmidt & Lawrence W. Sherman, Does Arrest Deter Domestic
Violence?, in DO A RRESTS AND R ESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 43, 49 (Eve S. Buzawa &
Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1996) (suggesting that mandatory arrest policies may reduce
domestic violence overall, but increase violence against its poorest victims).
4. See Donna Coker, Crime Control and Feminist Law Reform in Domestic Violence
Law: A Critical Review, 4 B UFF. CRIM. L. R EV. 801, 801 (2001) (recognizing that
although the police, as agents of the state, are responsible for protecting citizens,
often that responsibility is carried out in such a way that it reinforces disadvantages
already experienced by women).
5. See Mills, supra note 1, at 551 (proposing that alternate measures must be
taken to promote respectful relationships between battered women and state actors
so that mandatory state interventions will not replicate the emotions that are
endemic to abusive relationships).
6. See generally JEFFREY F AGAN , N ATL INST. OF JUST., THE CRIMINALIZATION OF
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: PROMISES AND L IMITS 1 (1996) (decrying the lack of reliable
empirical studies of the effects of using criminal law to combat domestic violence), at
http://www.ncjrs.org/txtfiles/crimdom.txt.
7. See infra notes 27-28 and accompanying text. Both sections 304B and 498A of
the Indian Penal Code focus on dowry violence. Id. When section 304B was passed,
section 113B of the Indian Evidence Code was also enacted, creating a presumption
that a death under certain circumstances is a dowry death. Id. Both statutes only
address marital violence; accordingly, this article also focuses solely on marital
violence. This Article does not deny the existence of either heterosexual or
homosexual non-marital couples violence in India. However, such non-marital
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practice and how they have been understood reveals additional
problems with the strategy of relying on criminal law to keep women
safe from intimate abuse. These two Indian statutes have been
problematic in four distinct, yet related, ways. First, they established
statutory enforcement within the criminal justice system. The actors
within the Indian criminal justice system, like those in criminal justice
agencies worldwide, are not trained to recognize or be concerned
8
with domestic violence. Traditionally, it has not been part of their
agenda. As a result, courts, police and other actors have a distinct
tendency to narrow the purview of the statutes and attempt to
reconcile such practice under the statutes with the demands of
dominant institutions.
Second, criminal law declares some conduct wrong without making
any normative statement about other related forms. In India,
criminal law has singled out dowry violence as the offending form of
9
violence. Consequently, the two anti-domestic violence laws passed
in the 1980s focus primarily on dowry violence and say relatively little
10
in condemnation of other forms of domestic violence. Therefore,
the police, courts and society may find other forms of intimate
violence against women to be less objectionable or even legitimate.
Women who are the victims of non-dowry forms of domestic violence
are likely to be discouraged from pursuing actions against their
abusers.
Third, the lines between legitimate and criminal conduct beg for
explanations. The failure to place criminal sanctions on violence
against women in the larger context of womens subordination makes
it difficult to sustain the reformist ideology that initially generated the
11
Instead of being seen as laws that were enacted to fight
laws.
womens subordination in India, the evil at which they are aimed is
variously redescribed as either colonialism or scheming mothers-inlaw. Both of these are historic boogeymen (or women) in modern
familial settings are so far from the accepted norm in India that such violence has
not yet been sufficiently discussed in literature about intimate violence.
8. See WOMEN S STUDIES UNIT, TATA INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, R ESPONSES TO
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN INDIA: A STUDY IN MAHARASHTRA AND MADHYA PRADESH 3
(1999) [hereinafter R ESPONSES TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN INDIA] (pointing out that
the state is reluctant to interfere in private matters because traditionally it has been
responsible for monitoring only public acts of wrongdoing).
9. See The Dowry Prohibition Act (India) (1961) (imprisoning and/or fining a
person for giving or taking dowry).
10. See infra notes 27-28, 73 (summarizing Indian Penal Code §§ 304B and 498A).
11. See E LIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, B ATTERED WOMEN & F EMINIST L AWMAKING 228-32
(2000) (arguing that until domestic violence is linked to gender roles and inequality,
little will change).
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India. One effect of blaming dowry violence on colonialism or
mothers-in-law is that the attention is displaced from male
dominance and control as the motive for the violence.
Finally, the use of criminal law emphasizes individual, rather than
systemic, responsibility for domestic violence. This emphasis might
seem counterintuitive because declaring a particular form of conduct
criminal can be understood as a statement that a significant segment
of society opposes such conduct and believes that social resources
12
should be used to prevent it. However, at a more practical, nonideological level, criminal statutes focus on the injury done by one
abuser, usually the husband or his family, to one victim. Individual
women must plead their cases on their own. There is no mechanism
within the criminal law system for aggregating these cases and
bringing a  class action. Criminal laws do not place intimate
violence in a social context whereby womens lives are subordinated
to mens and whereby the violence can occur or continue because
women have very few alternatives to life with their husbands.
Although the violence would not have been made criminal if it had
not been communally identified as a wrong, the focus on individual
cases and low conviction rates in these cases undercuts this message.
In short, the anti-dowry criminal statutes, enacted in the 1980s with
the support of womens advocates, have not provided a dramatic
protective effect. Instead, they have been implemented narrowly.
The underlying problem has been reinterpreted to maintain
consistency with dominant institutional and ideological norms. The
result is to de-emphasize the systemic subordination of women that
was at the root of the original attack on dowry violence. Although
this may generally be a problem of legal reformist efforts, it is
especially a problem of reliance on criminal law where we must rely
on enforcement by a limited cast of both the specialized institutional
actors and preexisting systems of criminal justice. To the extent that
law is to play a role in emancipating women, the experience in India
indicates that we should enlarge the array of legal remedies to
include civil remedies. Equally important, it shows the need to
educate the institutional players involved in the criminal justice
system and to resist explanatory systems that reposition the violence
in ways consistent with continued male dominance and
subordination of women.

12. See Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. R EV. 413, 41417 (1999) (explaining that criminal law reflects deeply held commitments that
define ones political community).
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B ACKGROUND: THE A NTI-DOWRY VIOLENCE CRIMINAL L AWS

The modern womens movement in India took root in the late
1960s and early 1970s with the economic dislocations caused by
severe drought, the Bangladeshi war and OPEC-induced inflation.
These problems, together with claims of political corruption,
precipitated widespread demonstrations against the government in
1974 and 1975 in the western state of Gujarat and the northern state
of Bijar. When, in June of 1975, a court found Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi guilty of corruption in connection with the 1971
Parliamentary elections, she declared a national emergency
( Emergency ).13
Over the twenty-one months of the Emergency, more than 100,000
people were arrested and imprisoned without trial. Parliament
passed a constitutional amendment that permitted the government to
suspend civil liberties and that reduced the courts power of judicial
review. Freedom of the press was one of the civil liberties restricted
during this period. One result of the Emergency was that conducting
normal political discourse was extremely difficult, while movement
14
politics could flourish.
Both the underlying economic problems and the declaration of the
15
Emergency contributed to the growth of womens activism. The
drought, war and inflation resulted in significant increases in the
prices of everyday goods like food and clothing. These price
increases mostly affected the lives of women, who are usually in
charge of the provision of these commodities for their families. The
Anti-Price-Rise Movement of the early 1970s created the opportunity
16
for women to build coalitions and organize around a set of issues.
The movement originated in Mumbai, but spread from there to other
13. See L ESLIE J. CALMAN , TOWARD E MPOWERMENT: WOMEN AND MOVEMENT
POLITICS IN INDIA 25-32 (1992).
14. See id. at 32-37 (stating that at the end of the Emergency, there was an
explosion of new movements dedicated to achieve human rights and economic
progress).
15. See id. at 49 (explaining how international feminism may also have
encouraged the development of the womens movement in India at this time). In
1967, the U.N. adopted the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, which called for member states to submit reports on the status of
women in their own countries. Id. The Indian government released its report,
Toward Equality, in 1971. Id. The report illuminated the poor conditions of women
in India with regard to economics, education, family and legal rights and helped the
more educated and politicized Indians to see that something needed to be done to
achieve full equality in Indian society. Id.
16. See CALMAN , supra note 13, at 47 (explaining that the Anti-Price-Rise
Movement was a gendered response to the decline of the countrys economic
condition).
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urban areas, including New Delhi. It is clear from the form of the
demonstrations that they were organized by women with womens
concerns in mind. In one march, a thousand women carried small
stoves to represent their need for food; in another they banged
wooden spoons on metal plates; in yet a third, 20,000 women
marched through the streets of Mumbai shaking wooden rolling
18
pins.
Just as women were beginning to organize around this new set of
19
issues and create new coalitions, Gandhi declared the Emergency.
This foreclosed normal political debate and party politics. The
censorship made criticism of the government extremely difficult,
although the Emergency itself heightened concern about human
20
rights. Leslie Calman, a political scientist who studies women in
India, speculates,  as a result, dowry deaths became a topic of press
coverage; human rights abuses could be covered if they were not
21
explicitly concerned with government. Ironically, then, it was the
 private nature of violence against women that allowed it to move to
the forefront of the nations consciousness.
By the mid-1980s, Indian newspapers and feminist journals were
full of stories similar to that of Shakuntala Arora, a lecturer at a
womens college. At the time of her marriage, her future husband
insisted on receiving a present of a scotter as a dowry. If her parents
did not comply, the wedding would be cancelled. Because a wedding
cancellation would be a tremendous embarrassment for Aroras
family, her parents met his demands. However, after the wedding,
her husband made more demands for money and threatened to beat
Arora if she failed to procure the money from her parents. The
ensuing abuse was not only physical; it extended to other areas of her
life. Although she was employed, he allowed her only a small amount
of spending money. Over time, his violence toward her escalated.
For instance, when she was pregnant with their second child, he
kicked her in the stomach. Shortly after her delivery via cesarean
section, he beat her while she was holding the baby. Two days before
her death, ostensibly because she had failed once again to get
17. See id. (detailing the widespread effect of the Anti-Price-Rise Movement).
18. See id. at 47-48.
19. See id. at 32 (quoting Gandhis reasons for issuing a national Emergency).
Gandhi claimed that a  deep and widespread conspiracy . . . [had] been brewing
since the introduction of  certain progressive measures of benefit to the common
man and woman. Id.
20. Id. at 63 (suggesting that censorship contributed to the developing outrage of
 dowry murder ).
21. Id.
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additional money from her mother, he beat her again and prevented
her from attending her brothers marriage. Ultimately, her husband
burned Arora to death in a type of fire often set by husbands to rid
22
themselves of unwanted wives.
As a result of stories like Aroras, one of the places that the newlyenergized womens movement directed its attention was toward
dowry-based violence against wives.
One leading womens
organization, the cooperative that publishes the womens journal
Manushi, initiated a boycott of dowry weddings, in hopes that this
23
Other
trend would make dowry less socially acceptable.
organizations used mass demonstrations in front of abusers homes in
an effort to shame them into foreswearing violence against their
24
wives. As part of their campaign against dowry-induced violence,
womens organizations also argued in favor of making such violence
25
criminal.
The lobbying of womens groups helped prompt the passage of two
important pieces of legislation in the mid-1980s. Consistent with the
public focus of the time, both specifically prohibit dowry violence,
although the 1983 statute, colloquially known as the  Anti-Cruelty
statute or section 498A of the Indian Penal Code ( IPC ), also
26
includes within its terms other forms of domestic violence. The
1983 statute criminalized the act of cruelty toward a wife. It provided
that if a husband or his relatives subjected his wife to  cruelty, he or
22. See MEETA R ANI JHA, E ND A BUSE, INDIA; CHAPPAL, STICKS, AND B AGS (last visited
Apr. 4, 2003) (recounting the story of a murdered wife who faced dowry
harassment), available at http://endabuse.org/programs/display.php3?DocID=102;
see also Deepti, Women Lecturers Mobilize Against Dowry Death, in IN SEARCH OF A NSWERS:
INDIAN WOMEN S VOICES FROM MANUSHI 213, 213 (Madhu Kishwar & Ruth Vanita eds.,
1984) (describing the same story). See generally CALMAN , supra note 13, at 123 (listing
dowry death headlines from a single week in 1986).
23. Madhu Kishwar, Rethinking Dowry Boycott, 48 MANUSHI 10, 10-13 (1988)
(describing the history of the dowry boycott).
24. See Editorial, Fight Against Dowry: Liberating Slaves of Money and Property,
MANUSHI July-Aug. 1979, reprinted in IN SEARCH OF A NSWERS: INDIAN WOMEN S VOICES
F ROM MANUSHI 246 (Madhu Kishwar & Ruth Vanita eds., 1984); see also Diane Mitsch
Bush, Womens Movements and State Policy Reform Aimed at Domestic Violence Against
Women: A Comparison of the Consequences of Movement Mobilization in the U.S. and India, 6
GENDER & SOCY 587, 596-97 (1992) (recounting an instance in 1979 in which
womens activists staged a demonstration outside of Tarvindar Kaurs in-laws home
after it was discovered she had died as a result of a kerosene fire set by them). There
was also a march to Parliament. Id. at 597.
25. See Bush, supra note 24, at 596-97 (explaining how attempts to involve the
police or court system in dowry-based violence often proved futile, and therefore,
husbands were not being held accountable for their actions).
26. A 1961 statute, the Dowry Prohibition Act, had outlawed the giving or
accepting of dowry. It proved extremely difficult to enforce, and was amended in
1985 and 1988. SHOBHA SAXENA, CRIMES A GAINST WOMEN AND PROTECTIVE L AWS 11718 (1995).
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the relatives would be subject to either imprisonment or a fine. The
statute defines cruelty either as willful conduct likely to drive a
woman to suicide or to cause her grave injury, or as harassment based
27
The second criminal statute, the  Dowry
on dowry demands.
Death statute, section 304B of the IPC, was passed in its current
form in 1986. It made it a crime attributable to the husband or his
relatives if a woman died of non-natural causes within seven years of
her wedding, and if just before her death she had been harassed for
28
dowry by either her husband or his relatives.
Unfortunately, studies show that these statutes have not been
successful in significantly reducing levels of violence against Indian
29
30
wives. In 1994, there were 4935 dowry deaths in India. Since then,
the reported incidence of such deaths has been rising. By 1998, the
31
number was 6917. Cases involving cruelty toward wives have risen
32
steadily from 21,916 reported cases in 1993 to 36,432 in 1997.
27. See V.K. DEWAN , L AW R ELATING TO DOWRY PROHIBITION 184 (2000) (providing
the text of section 489A of the Indian Penal Code).
Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman,
subjects such woman to cruelty, shall be punished with imprisonment for a
term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.
Id.
28. See id. at 182 (providing the text of section 304B of the Indian Penal Code).
Dowry Death (1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or
bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within
seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she
was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her
husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall
be called  dowry death, and such husband or relative shall be deemed to
have caused her death.
Id.; see also id. at 220 (noting that section 113B of the Evidence Act creates a
presumption for use in connection with section 304B).
Presumption as to dowry death  When the question is whether a person has
committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her
death such woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or
harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court
shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death.
Id.
29. See R ESPONSES TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN INDIA, supra note 8, at 2 (theorizing
that statutes have been ineffective due to a variety of factors, including police
reluctance, emphasis on reconciliation, male bias in the police system, and lack of
access to legal services).
30. See DEWAN , supra note 27, at vii (indicating there were 4935 dowry deaths in
all of India in 1994).
31. Soma Wadhwa, Fair Sex or Fair Game? OUTLOOK, May 29, 2000 (reporting the
last recorded figure for dowry deaths at the time of the articles release), at
www.outlookindia.com; see also DEWAN , supra note 27, at vii (noting that there were
5850 dowry deaths within the states of India in 1997, and 6006 dowry deaths in all of
India).
32. See DEWAN , supra note 27, at vii.
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Another study of 737 cases registered under the Anti-Cruelty statute
in the 1990s shows that only 2.2% resulted in convictions, over 55%
33
resulted in acquittals and 25% were withdrawn. Complaints about
the low number of arrests and the high number of acquittals are
34
These complaints highlight the problems with
common.
criminalization as a means of improving womens safety from
violence in the home.
II. PROBLEM ONE : E NFORCEMENT THROUGH A CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM NOT TRAINED IN THE DYNAMICS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
Many womens advocates understand domestic violence to be a
35
means through which a man maintains control over his partner.
Constant violence is not necessary; rather, violence reinforces a set of
rules that the abuser decrees. Mere references to a previous violent
incident may be sufficient to keep the wife in line.
This
understanding of violence as a method of control means that violent
incidents do not occur because the man lost his temper or drank too
much. These are only the excuses that allow the man to be violent.
The violence itself is a means of subordinating women.
This understanding, however, does not extend to much of the
research community in India where spousal violence is attributed to
many things, but rarely to male desire for control. Thus, one study of
a sample of people imprisoned for family offenses concluded that the
33. See N ISHI MITRA, UNIT FOR WOMEN S STUD., TATA INST. FOR SOC. SCI., DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE AS A PUBLIC ISSUE: A R EVIEW OF R ESPONSES 12 (2000) (surveying police cases
in Yawatmal registered under Section 498A from 1990 to 1996).
34. See SAXENA, supra note 26, at 164 (discussing the low number of arrests); see
also MITRA, supra note 33, at 12 (discussing the high number of acquittals and
withdrawals); Wadhwa, supra note 31 (reporting that of the 577 cases in a recent
three-year period in the state of Karnataka, only twenty-two ended with convictions);
Geethadevi et al., Getting Away with Murder: How Law Courts and Police Fail Victims of
Domestic Violence, 117 MANUSHI 31 (2000) (explaining that the amendments to
criminal law have not increased the number of cases booked as penal offenses or of
domestic violence convictions).
35. See A. Mahajan, Instigators of Wife Beating, in VIOLENCE A GAINST WOMEN 1, 7
(Sushma Sood ed., 1990) (concluding that male respondents of a survey view wifebeating as a way to establish obedience); see also Domestic Abuse Intervention Project:
Power and Control and Equality Wheels, in CLARE DALTON & E LIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER,
B ATTERED WOMEN AND THE L AW 66-68 (2001) (showing, in addition to the  power and
control wheel and  equality wheel, the violent and controlling behaviors checklist
that is used to help batterers identify and take responsibility for their behaviors);
R ICHARD J. GELLES, F AMILY VIOLENCE 139-48 (2d ed. 1987) (stating that rape is an
attempt by a man to exercise power over a woman); SCHNEIDER, supra note 11, at 4647, 66-67 (characterizing male control as  coercive control and acknowledging that
 issues of power and control are troubling characteristics of all intimate
relationships ); Evan Stark, Re-Presenting Woman Battering: From Battered Woman
Syndrome to Coercive Control, 58 A LB. L. R EV. 973, 982, 1009-26 (1995) (framing
battering in the context of  coercive control ).
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main cause of the offenders violent behavior was maladjustment to
36
Reasons for maladjustment include immaturity and
marriage.
37
sexual jealousy. At other points, the same study argues that social
38
position makes a person more likely to be violent. According to
another study, husbands claimed that they beat their wives because
the  wives were of bad temperament, shirkers of domestic work, did
not look after the children properly and fought with their in-laws . . .
[wives claimed that their husbands beat them] because of their
[husbands] frustration due to poverty, suspicious nature,
quarrelsome children, consumption of alcohol, and back-biting by in39
laws.
In addition, many commentators blame intimate violence in India
on the institution of the joint family and the brides need to adjust to
a new, extended family after marriage.40 The stereotypical Indian
family is thought of as multigenerational, where the bride moves
from her parents home upon marriage to live with the groom, his
parents, and siblings, all of whom often reside in a distant
41
community. Furthermore, within this family structure, the grooms
loyalties are understood to lie with his mother and natal family, and
42
not with his wife.
36. See R ANJANA JAIN , F AMILY VIOLENCE IN INDIA 20 (1992) (resorting to family
violence instead of redemption when people are unable to make marital
adjustments); see also F RANCIS B LOCH & VIJAYENDRA R AO, POVERTY AND HUMAN R ES.,
DEV. R ESEARCH GROUP, TERROR AS A B ARGAINING INSTRUMENT: A CASE-STUDY OF DOWRY
VIOLENCE IN R URAL I NDIA 22 (World Bank Group, Working Paper No. 2347, 2000)
(concluding that violent behavior is strongly linked to economic incentives); Leela
Visaria, Violence against Women in India: Evidence from Rural Gujarat, in A SUMMARY
R EPORT OF THREE STUDIES 9, 12 (Gujarat Inst. of Dev. Stud. ed., 1999) (attributing
household mistakes as the major proximate cause for violent outbursts). But see
Mahajan, supra note 35, at 7.
37. See JAIN , supra note 36, at 43-44, 60-62 (hypothesizing motives for violence).
38. Id. at 22 (suggesting more violence occurs in rural ares than urban areas).
39. Ranbir Singh Bhatti, Socio-Cultural Dynamics of Wife Battering, in VIOLENCE
A GAINST WOMEN 45, 47 (Sushma Sood ed., 1990). See Visaria, supra note 36, at 12
(noting that violence is attributed to womens housekeeping, child care, and food
preparation).
40. See JAIN , supra note 36, at 61 (stating females have to make more family
adjustments than males).
41. See Sudhir Kakar, Feminine Identity in India, in WOMEN IN INDIAN SOCIETY 44, 61
(Rehana Ghadially ed., 1988) (noting that the exogamous nature of this
arrangement may also contribute to continuing violence because new brides are
often very isolated in their new communities); see also Michael S. Billig, The Marriage
Squeeze on High-Caste Rajasthani Women, 50 J. A SIAN STUDIES 341, 346 (1991)
(discussing long distances between natal and marital families).
42. See A MARJIT MAHAJAN & MADHURIMA, F AMILY VIOLENCE AND A BUSE IN INDIA 1314 (1995); see also Kakar, supra note 41, at 64 (reporting that 56% of men felt closer
to their mothers than their wives while only 20% reported the reverse); Mahajan,
supra note 35, at 7 (noting that for those who participated in the study, wives claimed
that their husbands followed the demands of their parents or siblings). Similarly,
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When violence is seen as resulting from difficulties adjusting to
married life or a new extended family, it is not surprising that the
favored remedy, even within the criminal justice system, often focuses
on conciliation and compromise. Instead of viewing the criminal
justice system as a potential counter-balance to the husbands attempt
at total control and subordination of his wife, courts and police often
fear that intervention will exacerbate adjustment difficulties. They
put the continuation of the marriage above the safety of the victim.43
As is often the case elsewhere in the world, Indian judges are happy
to dismiss criminal proceedings if the victimized wife requests it. As
one Indian judge said, the  warring spouses came to terms because
the wife decided that she would prefer a  peaceful life with her
husband when compared to what she feared her life would have been
if he served a two year sentence. Under those circumstances, the
judge and the wife both worried that the  expected peace would
elude the couple. 44 The judge reduced the husbands sentence to
time served to allow the couple to reconcile immediately.
The police and the government have also established counseling
centers to assist women who are the subjects of violence. The
creation of these centers is consistent with a framing of the problem
of violence as one of adjustment to marriage rather than one of
control and subordination of wives. Many police stations set up
special womens units, known as All Women Police Stations
( AWPS ), which are intended to handle womens issues. Although
created in response to the problem of familial violence against wives,
the AWPS frequently tries to conciliate domestic complaints, and
ultimately often sends the women victims back to their abusive
45
marital families. Furthermore, the establishment of the AWPS may
even contribute to the marginalization of womens complaints of
domestic violence. Now, police officers at the main police stations
often insist that women file domestic violence complaints at the
AWPS. This allows the non-AWPS officers to avoid dealing with these
mothers see their sons as their  saviour and source of self-esteem. R ANJANA KUMARI,
B RIDES ARE N OT FOR B URNING: DOWRY VICTIMS IN INDIA 15 (1989).
43. See infra notes 137-41 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of
marriage in Indian social life).
44. Raghumunda Satya Narayana v. State of Andra Pradesh, 2000 AIR SCW 1894
(2000), ¶ 3.
45. See Veena Poonacha & Divya Pandey, Responses to Domestic Violence in Karnataka
and Gujarat, in A SUMMARY R EPORT OF THREE STUDIES 31 (Res. Ctr. for Womens Stud.
( RCWS ) & SNDT Womens Univ. eds., 1999) (stating that although All Women
Police Stations ( AWPS ) assume responsibility of domestic violence issues, the
number of officially recorded and prosecuted cases remains low because of poor
quality services and low rates of utilization).
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complaints. As a result, it is easy for the police, the victims, and
their victimizers to view spousal abuse as less serious than other
47
criminal acts.
The government has also funded family counseling cells to deal
with domestic violence. These family counseling cells are often
48
located in or near police stations. Like the AWPS, they too have the
goal of strengthening family ties as a means of eliminating the need
49
In some counseling centers, the staff
for legal intervention.
members do not see the problem as the assertion of male dominance
and control over women, but rather as a problem of  womens sharp
50
tongues and mens tendency to  hit and beat in response. They
51
see their own role as being non-judgmental.
One womens
organization claims that in Bangalore,  counselling centres have
today degenerated into a useful mechanism for sidetracking women
who invoke the law to protect themselves against domestic
52
battering.
Similarly, the police themselves have traditionally understood
problems of domestic violence, whether dowry-based or otherwise, as
stemming from maladjustment on the part of the victim. The police
often blame the womans immoral behavior, thinking  [o]therwise
46. Cf. Nishi Mitra, Best Practices Among Responses to Domestic Violence in Maharashtra
and Madhya Pradesh, in A SUMMARY R EPORT OF THREE STUDIES 22 (Womens Stud.
Unit, Tata Inst. of Soc. Sci. ed., 1999) (implying that AWPS were created to
encourage and handle the reporting of crimes against women); Poonacha & Pandey,
supra note 45, at 32 (noting that the displacement of gender related crimes onto
AWPS prevents the rest of the police force from being informed about the sensitized
nature and significance of domestic violence).
47. See R ESPONSES TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN INDIA, supra note 8, at 2 (indicating
that the AWPS may also have the unfortunate effect of reinforcing the ideology of
womens inferiority to men because the female police officers assigned to the AWPS
are usually undertrained and placed in poor facilities with poor equipment); see also
Poonacha & Pandey, supra note 45, at 32 (stating that the AWPS officers face greater
discrimination in receiving promotions and that their lack of training and isolation
prevent policewomen from gaining necessary experience to transfer to other
stations). Postings to the AWPS are often viewed as punitive, and under these
circumstances it is hard to see how the presence of these special units for women can
do much more than perpetuate womens subordination. See Mitra, supra note 46, at
22.
48. See Poonacha & Pandey, supra note 45, at 32 (indicating that placement of
family counseling cells near police stations was in response to increased family and
marriage-related crimes and disputes).
49. Id. (stating that the goal of these cells was to strengthen and improve family
ties with the help of community intervention); see also Geethadevi et al., supra note
34, at 32-33 (reporting that counseling centers measure success by the number of
cases they succeed in reconciling).
50. See Poonacha & Pandey, supra note 45, at 33.
51. Id. at 32 (observing that counselors feel their job is to encourage women to
speak up about their abuse and help them evaluate their options).
52. See Geethadevi et al., supra note 34, at 32.
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53

no sane husband would do this; they may see the beating as a
54
family quarrel in which they should not intervene; or they may
55
pressure the woman to return quietly to her husband. One horrific
example of misunderstanding the criminal nature of spousal abuse
involved a case in which a woman was kicked in the stomach while in
the late stages of pregnancy and then beaten immediately after the
caesarian delivery. The womans neighbors even reported seeing her
being beaten outdoors, yet the police refused to investigate and the
district commissioner of police told a group of the womans
colleagues, who had gathered to protest, that  this is not a case, it is
an incident. . . . I have 5000 incidents like this. It is a very ordinary
56
matter.
To him, it was not a criminal matter at all, but just an
 incident in everyday life.
Reliance on the police as the first line of defense against domestic
violence is also problematic because police themselves have long
been a source of violence and hostility toward women. Two famous
cases from the late 1970s and early 1980s initially sparked feminists
outrage. In one, a fifteen year-old orphan girl was raped and fondled
by two police officers who later claimed she consented to such
57
treatment. In another, a woman was gang raped by police. When
58
her husband complained, they beat him to death. Although these
cases ultimately resulted in statutory changes, rape and harassment of
women in police custody continue to be major problems in many
59
parts of India.
The courts too have misunderstood the problem of dowry violence.
They have not viewed it as part of the larger problem of violence
aimed at controlling wives lives. The Dowry Murder Act creates a
53. See Alfie, Was Her Death More Hurtful, or Her Life?, in IN SEARCH OF A NSWERS:
INDIAN WOMEN S VOICES FROM MANUSHI 215, 216 (Madhu Kishwar & Ruth Vanita eds.,
1984).
54. Id.
55. See MITRA, supra note 33, at 8 (noting that police often label victims of
domestic violence as  quarrelsome, revengeful and without family values ).
56. Deepti, supra note 22, at 213-14.
57. See CALMAN , supra note 13, at 64-67.
58. Id. at 68 (summarizing the story of Rameeza Bees rape and her husbands
death).
59. See Svati Chakravarty-Bhatkal, Who Will Wipe the Tears of Indian Rape Victims?,
NCAS A DVOCACY I NTERNET (Apr. 1999) (stating that rape in custody is commonplace
at police stations or government shelters for destitute women), at
http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/grhf/SAsia/suchana/1299/h042.html; Women Criticise
Police Chief, TIMES N EWS N ETWORK, Sept. 5, 2002 (blaming the Delhi police chief for
indirectly telling the police force that provocatively dressed woman are asking to be
raped), at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/cms.dll/articleshow?artid=21200356
&sType=1.
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presumption against spouses and in-laws in the case of a death
60
 soon after a dowry demand. If these demands are not viewed as
inextricably linked to other patterns of violence and repression
within the family, relevant information will be excluded from
evidence or underplayed by the courts. The result will be that the
effectiveness of the statute will be undermined. One place that we
see this occurring is in the interpretation of the evidentiary
presumption that accompanies the Dowry Murder Act. Another is in
the interpretation of the word  soon.
Section 113B of the Evidence Code creates a presumption that the
person who has harassed a woman for dowry is responsible for her
61
death. It recognizes the disastrous effects that dowry abuse can have
on a womans life. As one court understood, once the humiliation of
dowry demands is shown, it can be assumed, even in a case that
involves suicide, that the woman killed herself to avoid further
62
Other courts have, despite the mandatory
humiliation.
presumption, been less willing to accept the connection between
previous dowry abuse and a wifes death. For example, in one case,
in which there was evidence of earlier dowry demands, the woman
63
died as a result of a fall into a well. It was unclear if the fall was a
homicide, suicide, or even an accident, but section 113-B should
allow the courts to recognize that, in a case in which there have been
previous dowry demands an accident or unrelated suicide is unlikely.
In this particular case, the husband confessed guilt to the womans
father, although this was later described by the court as merely an
acknowledgment that he had  accidentally assaulted her. Her body
bore signs of injury. Despite all of this, the court did not invoke the
presumption.
Cases such as this, which include other evidence of violence,
illustrate the courts reluctance to view dowry violence as a particular
manifestation of domestic violence in general. The court here did
not recognize that the pattern of violence demonstrated by the
husbands confession and by the physical evidence that she had
suffered recent injuries reinforced the evidence of the dowry
demands. If the court does not see that physical assault and dowry
demands are consistent with one another, and as reinforcing a
60. Dowry Death (India), INDIA PENAL CODE § 304B (1986).
61. See DEWAN , supra note 27, at 220.
62. A.N. SAHA, SUPREME COURT ON CRIMINAL L AW (1950-1999) 2172 (1999)
(describing Satpal v. State of Haryana, 1999 Cr. L.J. 596, 597).
63. State of Haryana v. Rajinder Singh, Crim. App. No. 1574 of 1995
(27.02.1996).
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pattern of subordination, then it is much less likely to hold that
either one occurred. In cases like this, the courts misunderstanding
of the dynamics of violence means that it is less likely to believe that
there was familial violence in general or dowry violence in particular.
The result is that the potential scope of the statute is narrowed and
even cases that do involve dowry violence will not be seen as such.
Similarly, there is a question about how to interpret  soon in the
dowry death statute, section 304B of the IPC. The dowry death
statute requires that the death occur  soon after a threat connected
with a dowry demand in order to invoke the presumption that the
husband or in-laws caused the death. If  soon is narrowly
interpreted to mean that there cannot be much time between a
demand in which dowry is mentioned and the death, then the statute
is much less likely to be used effectively in cases in which dowry
demands are part of a larger scheme of harassment that drives the
woman to commit suicide or results in the defendants killing her.
One common fact pattern involves husbands or their relatives who,
after the wedding, harass the wives for more dowry. Eventually the
women become so distressed that they leave their marital home and
return to their parents home. However, remaining with their
64
parents is not a long-term option because it is socially stigmatized.
Thus, after varying periods of time the women return to their
husbands. If the woman is killed by her husband or his relatives after
returning to the marital home, the death can be treated as a
homicide and the dowry death statute is not needed. On the other
hand, if she commits suicide or if homicide cannot be proven, then
the dowry death statute may be useful in obtaining a conviction since
the court can then invoke the presumption that the husband or his
family was responsible.
The interpretation of  soon is of particular importance. If dowry
demands are understood as part of a pattern of abuse directed at the
wife to maintain the dominant position of the husband and his
family, then it is unlikely to matter to the woman whether the
husband has refrained from repeating his dowry demands since she
returned to the marital home. He may well have been abusive or
signaled his continuing power in other ways and she may have
understood the message that she would be unable to escape from her
unbearable position. Renewed non-dowry abuse or subtle reminders
of his power to abuse may have the identical effect on her as renewed
64. See infra notes 141-45 and accompanying text (explaining that married
daughters parents do not usually permanently welcome married daughters at their
home).
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dowry-related abuse would. Indeed it may be indistinguishable. It
may be this overall message that has caused her suicide. For her,
these later threats were connected to the dowry demands because she
understands that they are all part of an effort to indicate her
subordinate position within the family. Whether they explicitly
referred to dowry, or even, whether there are later explicit threats of
65
any type, would not matter.
The Indian Supreme Court has not been clear as to how the word
 soon in the dowry death statute should be interpreted. In one
66
case, Kans Raj v. State of Punjab, the wifes death occurred
approximately one month after she had spent the night at her
67
brothers house, complaining that she did not feel safe at her own.
The prosecution proved that she had been the subject of numerous
demands for dowry prior to visiting her brother, but none were in
evidence after that time. Despite that, the Court held that, although
there was a lapse of just over a month between the most recent dowry
demands and the womans death, this was still  soon after the
demands because there were no intervening events that would show
the termination of the dowry harassment. This is an example of a
very desirable interpretation of the statute. It recognizes the
continuing effect that earlier threats will have on a womans
subsequent understanding of her position in the family.
In contrast, in another similar case, the Indian Supreme Court
found that the dowry death statute could not be used to convict the
husband because the dowry demands had sent the wife to her fathers
house where she had stayed, in fear for her life, for eighteen
68
69
months. In this case, a local panchayat had tried to smooth over the
situation before the woman returned to her husbands house. The
Indian Court found that intervention to be significant. It refused to
find the husband guilty under the dowry death statute on the
65. See Karla Fischer et al., The Culture of Battering and the Role of Mediation in
Domestic Violence Cases, 46 SMU L. R EV. 2117, 2117-18 (1993) (recognizing that
women subjected to abuse are often able to interpret danger signs of a batterers
conduct that might be meaningless to those not involved in an intimate relationship
with the batterer); Kathleen Waits, Battered Women and Their Children: Lessons from One
Womans Story, 35 HOUS. L. R EV. 29, 37 (1998) (describing one womans response to
 the look from her abusive husband).
66. Kans Raj v. State of Punjab, 556 LRI 3 (2000).
67. Id. ¶ 5.
68. Saha, supra note 62, at 2174 (discussing Sham Lal v. State of Haryana, 1997
Cr. L.J. 1927).
69. See generally Kimberly A. Klock, Resolution of Domestic Disputes Through ExtraJudicial Mechanisms in the United States and Asia, 15 TEMP. INTL & COMP. L.J. 275, 276
(2001) (describing panchayat as a type of village council that exists in several forms
with each having different responsibilities).
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grounds that there were no events demonstrating dowry harassment
in the two weeks or so between when the victim left her parents
house and when she died. This is unfortunate because the fact that
the woman was sufficiently frightened to remain away from her
marital home for a year and a half probably indicates a very serious
level of violence given the social stigma attached to such a long stay.
Furthermore, it is not uncommon for someone to try to patch up the
situation between the woman and her husband before she returns
70
home. If the panchayats efforts are seen as negating the continuing
harassment, it will be impossible to prosecute many serious cases.
The Courts failure here to understand the eighteen months that
the woman stayed away from her marital home as indicative of the
danger attached to her situation and its willingness to see outside
intervention as protective of the victim display a fundamental
misunderstanding of the dynamics of the womans relationship with
her husband and in-laws. The Court, like the police, appears to
believe that the dowry violence is a superficial problem perhaps due
to maladjustment or differing understandings of a marriage contract.
Time and the local panchayat might be able to resolve these. Time
and the local panchayat, however, will do little to change the womans
position in the family or her husbands power and control over her.
Unlike the decision in Kans Raj, the Court here is not recognizing the
dowry violence as part of a system of behaviors aimed at maintaining
the womans subordination within the family.
These misunderstandings of the dynamics of family violence and of
the role that dowry violence plays undermine the efforts to eliminate
the violence through the use of the criminal justice system. Even
well-meaning police may recommend to victims that they undergo
counseling and return to the family. If the misogynist attitudes of
some police have not changed, reliance on the criminal justice system
for protection may actually further endanger some women. Finally, if
the courts continue to believe inaccurately that dowry violence is not
connected to larger patterns of mental and physical abuse of women,
they will miss dowry violence even when it is actually occurring. This
will significantly reduce the potential for the statutes to protect
victims of domestic violence.

70. See Balram Prasad Agrawal v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. (1997) S.C. 1830, 1832-33
(describing how a wifes father may intervene to encourage her to return to her
husband). Often the wifes father or brother will try to effect a compromise that
allows her to return to her marital home because her remaining in her natal home
for a length of time is often economically difficult and socially stigmatizing. Id.
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III. PROBLEM TWO: CRIMINALIZING ONLY DOWRY VIOLENCE IMPLIES
THAT OTHER F ORMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE A GAINST WOMEN ARE
A CCEPTABLE.
Both the dowry murder statute and the cruelty statute have been
71
understood as focusing on the horror of dowry violence. Judicial
interpretations of these statutes have frequently been narrow so as to
make criminal only forms of violence that are clearly identifiable as
dowry violence. This simultaneously allows the courts to express their
moral outrage at the injuries of dowry violence without having to
think about the other forms of violence toward women that are
endemic in the society. Narrow interpretations of the statutes leave
the impression that only dowry violence matters. For example, one
incensed court wrote,  Every time a case relating to dowry death
comes up it causes ripples in the pool of conscience of this court.
Nothing can be more barbarous, nothing could be more heinous
72
than this sort of a crime. . . .  This sort of a crime refers back
only to deaths caused by dowry demands. It implies that other forms
of domestic violence are not equally heinous. Thinking about
violence in this way allows a court to consider only a very narrow slice
of the domestic violence women face and yet to believe it is doing
something to improve the situation of women. Similarly, a focus on
dowry violence means that in cases in which a wife is physically
abused and treated in a generally demeaning manner, only the
demeaning comments about the paltriness of her dowry and only the
physical violence connected to the insufficient dowry will matter.
Non-dowry violence is rarely even discussed in the cases. It is as if this
73
problem does not exist.
The courts handling of cases under the Anti-Cruelty statute,
section 498A, illustrates this tendency to focus on dowry violence to
the exclusion of all other forms of violence against wives. By its
terms, section 498A applies to situations involving either grave injury
to the wife or dowry demands. Both are not necessary. One would
71. See SAXENA, supra note 26, at 188-89 (criticizing statutory focus on dowry
violence as opposed to all forms of cruelty and abuse of a wife).
72. See D.N. Sandanshiv & Jolly Mathew, Legal Reform in Dowry Laws, in KALI;S YUG
84 (Rani Jethmalani ed., 1995) (discussing domestic violence as a concept confined
within the walls of the home and Indias inability to deal with this social problem
with any specificity). This article is also available at http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/
grhf/SAsia/forums/dowry/articles/reform.html.
73. See VEENA TALWAR OLDENBURG, DOWRY MURDER: THE IMPERIAL ORIGINS OF A
CULTURAL CRIME 219 (2002) (arguing that the focus on dowry-related violence makes
it difficult for victims of domestic violence to focus on the other painful aspects of
violence, such as violation of oneself, subordination, harassment, and suffering).
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therefore expect some cases prosecuted under this statute to involve
claims of dowry violence, but others to simply involve showings of
cruelty in other forms. Most convictions over the years, however,
74
In
have been in cases of deaths that involved dowry demands.
another case in which the victim died by falling into a well, the court
recounted the numerous ways in which, over the years, the husband
75
had treated the wife cruelly. These included beatings, expressions
of the husbands continuing desire to be married to another woman,
and ridicule during the early years of the marriage because she had
not yet produced any male heirs. The abuse had been so bad that the
woman had tried to commit suicide at least once previously. The
night before the womans death, neighbors had heard a fight going
on in her house during which she was assaulted by her husband. The
court found the husband and some of his relatives guilty of cruelty
under the  grave injury definition, not under the dowry demands
section. Despite all of this, when the court recounted the reasons for
finding the defendants guilty, it specifically mentioned the demands
76
for increased dowry. It is as if, without these demands, even the
level of abuse displayed here would have been insufficient for a
finding of cruelty.
Given the  grave injury language of section 498A, a tie to dowry
violence should not be necessary. Nor should a wifes death be
required to bring a case. Although the Supreme Court in a recent
case ruled that a case of cruelty could be based solely on  mental
77
torture or abnormal behaviour, the courts have repeatedly found
no liability for abuse that does not involve the wifes death and does
78
not include allegations of dowry violence. One commentator has
79
noted that  stray incidents of violence are insufficient. Section
498A tends to be used as a back-up in dowry death cases which for a
variety of reasons cannot be prosecuted under section 304B. This
74. See MITRA, supra note 33, at 9 (indicating that  there is a tendency to identify
Section 498A with dowry related crime, and stating that  it was customrary for the
police to add charges of dowry to Section 498A to make the case strong ); SAXENA,
supra note 26, at 181 (stating that such statutory provisions are intended to deal with
dowry deaths and bride burning instead of ordinary domestic violence).
75. See Balram Prasad Agarwal v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. (1997) S.C. 1830, 1834, ¶ 8
(discovering that cruel acts ranged from beatings to threats to kill).
76. Id. ¶ 12.
77. See Gananath Pattnaik v. State of Orissa, 2002 SCCL.COM 081 (2000).
78. See MITRA, supra note 33, at 8 (highlighting that only 5% of mental cruelty
cases even get booked).
79. See SAXENA, supra note 26, at 183 (1995) (stating that stray incidents do not
constitute cruelty); see also Asokan v. State, A.I.R. (2000) S.C.W. 3444, 3447, ¶ 5
(acquitting brother-in-law who threw hot coffee at victim).
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means that once again, the focus is on the dowry offense, and other
forms of abuse are often ignored or minimized in importance.
The police also tend to view dowry violence as criminal while other
forms of domestic violence are considered less serious. Remember,
for example, the case discussed above in which a woman was kicked
in the stomach while pregnant and then brutally beaten immediately
after the cesarean section, and of which the police official had said,
80
 This is not a case, it is an incident. . . . It is a very ordinary matter.
He was signaling his refusal to recognize brutal domestic violence as
being criminal. Instead, this type of non-dowry violence was so
ordinary in the officials mind that the police would not even
investigate the events as a crime. Although that case took place
before the Anti-Cruelty statute was enacted, commentators continue
to report that the police still do not take non-dowry violence
81
seriously. Nishi Mitra, a well-known researcher in the field, reports
that the police, and even lawyers, sometimes think domestic violence
cases cannot be prosecuted under the statutes without proof of dowry
demands. They often advise women to add allegations of dowry
demands to their reports so that the cases can be moved forward.
This well-meaning advice is unfortunate because the cases are then
likely to be thrown out when it becomes apparent that the claims
82
cannot be proven.
This tendency of criminalization to legitimate activities that are not
the focus of explicit criminal statutes is particularly problematic
because, not surprisingly, there is plenty of non-dowry violence in
India, as there is in the rest of the world. Overall statistics for
violence against wives vary from 22% to 60%, depending on the study

80. See Deepti, supra note 22, at 214.
81. Divya Pandey, Bride-Burning: Waheeda, in WOMEN S OPPRESSION IN THE PUBLIC
GAZE: A N A NALYSIS OF N EWSPAPER COVERAGE, STATE A CTION AND A CTIVIST R ESPONSE
(Meera Kosambi ed., 1994); SHOBHA SAXENA, CRIMES A GAINST WOMEN AND
PROTECTIVE L AWS 186-87 (1995). One womens organization discovered that its own
records included at least 800 cases of domestic violence in the Bangalore area. The
police only had 100 of these cases in their records. The discrepancy was ultimately
explained by the fact that the police confined their records in domestic violence
situations to cases that could be booked under the two anti-dowry statutes, Sections
304B and 498A. They considered all other cases to be  accidental deaths and
closed them iwthout much investigation. Report: Getting Away with Murder, 117
MANUSHI 31, 34 (2000); Kanhaiah Bhelari, Peanuts for the Bihar Judge, WEEK, Jan.13,
2002 (describing the story of police delay in acting on a domestic violence case),
available at http://www.the-week.com/22jan13/events3htm.
82. See MITRA, supra note 33, at 9 (stating that the truth is difficult to prove in a
court of law, but also questioning whether lies can be proven); see also Poonacha &
Pandey, supra note 45, at 31 (asserting that the AWPS frequently has to be dowryrelated to be taken seriously).
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83

and the area being studied. One study estimated that 15% of the
cases involving violence against wives was attributable to only dowry
84
According to the same study, 72% of first person
demands.
85
accounts of the violence and its causes do not even mention dowry.
Similarly, a feminist activist in India says,  I have not come across a
single case amongst the hundreds I have heard, read of or dealt with,
where the husband and in-laws harassed the woman because of dowry
alone. . . . Dissatisfaction is expressed not only with the quality and
86
quantity of the dowry but equally with the woman herself.
The
focus on dowry violence in the criminal laws has made other violence
appear less criminal and more part of everyday life.
In many areas of India, domestic violence in one form or another is
indeed part of everyday life.87 Although rates of violence vary
tremendously by geographic area, in some areas of India they are as
88
high as 75%. In addition, rates of physical violence against low caste
or scheduled caste women are higher than against high caste women,
although the latter report significant levels of verbal and emotional
89
abuse. For many women, violence may be normative because they
83. See B LOCH & R AO, supra note 36, at 2, 20 (discussing a study of three villages
in rural southern India that showed that 23% of the women have been beaten by
their husbands); see also Introduction, in A SUMMARY R EPORT OF THREE STUDIES 1 (1999)
(citing the overall rates of violence to be between 22% and 60%).
84. See Is Dowry the Real Killer?, 53 MANUSHI 5 (1989).
85. Id.; see KUMARI, supra note 42, at 58 (discussing another study that found 50%
of dowry victims attributed the violence to causes other than dowry demands).
86. See Kishwar, supra note 23, at 12.
87. See SAXENA, supra note 26, at 187 (emphasizing broad social acceptance of
wife beating).
88. See Visaria, supra note 36, at 10 (stating that significant rates of violence range
from 36-38% in Tamil Nadu and 28-42% in Uttar Pradesh). The two western states
of Madya Pradesh and Maharashtra account for nearly one-third of the total
registered crimes against women, despite the fact that they account for only about
15% of Indias population. See R ESPONSES TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN INDIA, supra note
8, at 1; CENSUS OF INDIA (last visited Mar. 5, 2003), available at http://www.
censusindia.net.
89. See Visaria, supra note 36, at 9, 11 (showing overall rates of wife abuse to be
between 74-80% for low caste women from rural Gujarat, 56% for Muslim women
from the same area, and 45% for high caste women from the same region). The
report also shows that only 17% of high caste women encounter physical abuse, as
compared to 57% of the low caste women. Id.; see also Mahajan, supra note 35, at 5
(showing violence against high caste women at 13-22% but violence against low caste
women at closer to 75%). Furthermore, a womans individual characteristics also
correlate with the level of violence. Id. It may be that women who have higher status
because of their education, ability to earn money in the market or current ability to
bear children are less likely to be abused. See Vijayendra Rao, Wife Abuse, its Causes
and its Impact on Intra-Household Resource Allocation in Rural Karnataka: A Participatory
Econometric Analysis, in GENDER, POPULATION AND DEVEVELOPMENT 103-04, 113
(Maithreyi Krishnaraj et al. eds., 1998) (arguing that wives who have not borne male
children, possibly because of age, or where sterilization has ended their reproductive
careers, are more likely to be abused, and that wives who earn outside income or are
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have been socialized into believing that their husbands are entitled to
power over them. The character of Sita in the well-known Indian
epic, the Ramayana, exemplifies the selflessness and dedication to
90
husband to which women are to aspire. When her husband, Lord
Rama was banished to the forest, Sita accompanied him, making his
path comfortable by stamping down the sharp grass in front of him so
that she, not he, would be cut by it. While in the forest, she was
kidnapped by Ravana who tried to seduce her, but she remained
faithful to Rama. Eventually, Rama rescued her, but after he heard
rumors that she had not been faithful, he banished her once again.
Despite this, she remained devoted only to him. Like Sita, an Indian
bride is supposed to be faithful and devoted to her husband,
regardless of the adversities she may face and how he has treated
91
her.
The ancient Indian Code of Manu also calls for women to honor
and obey their husbands.  [T]he wife should subject herself to the
authority of her husband. She should never do anything that might
92
displease him, whether he is alive or dead. A woman who treated
her husband with disrespect would suffer in eternity. Her religious
93
Another ancient
duty in this life was devotion  at his feet.
authority says that a wife should act like a slave in relation to her
94
husband, the master. A husbands  discipline of his wife is not
only permissible, but to be expected. It serves as a means of
establishing his power over her. As with domestic violence elsewhere
in the world, the precipitating causes of the beating might be trivial,
perhaps because the wife acted insufficiently graciously toward him
or had not adequately performed her household duties.95 Under
traditional rules, the husband was allowed to beat her with a rope or a
96
thin stick of bamboo.
more educated are less likely to be beaten). However, the higher the husbands level
of education, the greater the likelihood that the wife will be beaten. Id. at 113.
90. See Kakar, supra note 41, at 54 (retelling the legend of Sita); see also Jean
Johnson, Rama and the Ramayana: Lessons in Dharma (last visited Jan. 17, 2003)
(describing Sita as a continuing role model for young girls), available at http://
askasia.org/frclasrm/lessplan/1000054.htm.
91. See MAHAJAN & MADHURIMA, supra note 42, at 5; see also Vidhu Mohan, Is There
a Hope for Battered Wives?, in VIOLENCE A GAINST WOMEN 13 (Sushma Sood ed., 1990)
(analogizing to Saint Pauls clarification why women should remain subservient to a
man).
92. See MAHAJAN & MADHURIMA, supra note 42, at 4-5.
93. See Flavia Agnes, Wife Beating  Changes in Social Structure Crucial to Combat the
Problem, in VIOLENCE A GAINST WOMEN 57, 58-59 (Sushma Sood ed., 1990).
94. See MAHAJAN & MADHURIMA, supra note 42, at 4-5.
95. Id. at 5.
96. Id.; see Reva B. Siegel, The Rule of Love: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy,
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Many women in India continue to believe today that discipline at
the hands of their husbands and reverence and respect for their
husbands are completely appropriate. Women in India, like women
in the rest of the world, are unlikely to report freely on their
husbands violence against them. Even in their dying declarations,
many abused women will exonerate their husbands, hoping to ensure
that the men are not blamed for their wives deaths.97 Furthermore,
since many Indians, male and female, continue to believe that wife
abuse is a privilege of marriage and that husbands remain entitled to
98
beat their wives, women do not complain.
One researcher
discovered that 88% of the women surveyed in a village in rural
Karnataka said they would not complain if beaten, while 50% of the
women from two other villages in the same state responded
99
This researcher described seeing underreporting in
similarly.
action and offered two examples, both from the village of Halli in
the southern state of Karnataka to illustrate this.
A focus-group discussion being conducted with a group of women
was interrupted by a male relative of one of the participants. He
publicly shouted at her for neglecting her  household duties,
grabbed her by the hair and pulled her out of the meeting. A day
later, while a colleague and I were conducting an informal
discussion with a couple in their home, we heard loud screams
from the house next door. We ran over and found that a woman
was being slapped by her drunken husband. Despite the fact that
both these women were assaulted in our presence, neither said that
105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2117-21 (1996) (discussing the traditional notion that wife
beating was permitted in the United States and the conditions under which it was
permitted and, effectively, regulated). See generally Henry Ansgar Kelly, Rule of Thumb
and the Folklore of the Husbands Stick, 44 J. L EGAL E DUC. 341 (1994) (offering
humorous exploration of the  alleged rule of thumb with regard to the subject of
wife-beating).
97. See R ANJANA SHEEL, THE POLITICAL E CONOMY OF DOWRY: INSTITUTIONALIZATION
AND E XPANSION IN N ORTH INDIA 118 (1999) (noting that many traditional rituals are
observed to save  family honour ).
98. See SAXENA, supra note 26, at 174-76 (explaining that women are passive
victims); see also M. Harish Govind, Wife Beating Common in Kerala, Says Study, HINDU,
Apr. 11, 2002 (finding that 61% of women in Kerala believe that wife beating is
justified for reasons such as poor cooking, going out without informing the husband,
and failing to show in-laws sufficient respect), available at http://www.hinduonnet.
com/thehindu/2002/04/11/stories/2002041105790300.htm; Sunanda Kaushik,
Social and Treatment Issues in Wife Battering: A Reconsideration, in VIOLENCE A GAINST
WOMEN 23, 23 (Sushma Sood ed., 1990) (stating that men generally deny battering
and women deny being battered); Rao, supra note 89, at 99 (stipulating that between
50% and 88% of respondents surveyed said that if beaten, they would accept it
quietly); Rajalakshmi Sriram, Research on Marital Violence Some Trends, Implications
and Emerging Issues, in 2 R ESEARCH ON F AMILIES WITH PROBLEMS IN INDIA 486 (Unit for
Fam. Stud. ed., 1991) (stating that some women accept violence as inevitable).
99. See Rao, supra note 89, at 99 (discussing incidents of wife-beating).
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they had ever been physically abused by their husbands in response
100
to the survey questions.

For these women, the violence is simply part of their married lives.
The move to criminalize dowry violence does nothing to prevent
other forms of violence that are endemic in the lives of some women
in India. By focusing attention so strongly on dowry violence, the
criminalization strategy may unwittingly have reinforced the tendency
of courts, the police, society in general and women themselves to view
non-dowry related spousal violence as less significant or even as
acceptable. The statutes and complaint procedures have sometimes
been interpreted to imply that if the violence is not dowry-related, it
is not worth acting on. Moral outrage that is directed toward dowry
violence often fails to mention other forms of violence, implying that
there is nothing wrong with them.101 And age-old customs of
subordinating wives to husbands desires and discipline remain in
place, at least among some groups in some areas. Women themselves
often do not complain because this is the way they have been
socialized to understand the world. They do not understand
102
alternatives to exist.
The result of criminalizing only one form of
violence against women may well be to leave other forms intact and
unchallenged.
IV. PROBLEM THREE : IDENTIFYING THE E VIL F ORCE B EHIND CRIMINAL
A CTIVITY
The identification of criminal activity within a society involves the
demarcation of certain conduct as immoral or socially undesirable.
As a means of preserving current social structures, criminal conduct
100. Id. (offering numerical data regarding reported incidents within the studys
survey); see also Conclusion, in A SUMMARY R EPORT OF THREE STUDIES 42 (1999)
(discussing underreporting); Kaushik, supra note 89, at 23 (arguing that women deny
the violence used against them); Mahajan, supra note 35, at 5 (noting a study in
which 22% of husbands admitted abuse, compared to only 13% of wives who
admitted having been abused). This study demonstrates womens reluctance to
speak out against the violence and mens feeling of entitlement to use violence.
Furthermore, it shows that husbands are more willing to admit to having been
violent than are women to admit being the victims of such violence.
101. See Editorial, Fight Against Dowry: Liberating Slaves of Money and Property,
MANUSHI, July-Aug. 1979, reprinted in IN SEARCH OF A NSWERS: INDIAN WOMEN S VOICES
F ROM MANUSHI 246, 248-49 (Madhu Kishwar & Ruth Vanita eds., 1984) (indicating
that the  glorious heritage of systemic violence includes sati and female
infanticide); see also Kishwar, supra note 23, at 12 (arguing that downplaying  other
forms of harassment tends to draw public attention away from the inherent
powerlessness of women in the existing family structure ). But see Rajni Palriwala,
Reaffirming the Anti-Dowry Struggle, E CON . & POL. WKLY., Apr. 29, 1989, at 943 (arguing
that there are many activists who have protested dowry violence against women and
other forms of violence and other means of subordinating women).
102. See infra notes 148-62.

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol11/iss2/20

24

Greenberg: Criminalizing Dowry Deaths: The Indian Experience
GREENBERG_PKFINAL

2003]

5/13/03 3:21 PM

CRIMINALIZING DOWRY DEATHS

825

is often blamed on outsiders to society. When the Murrah Building
in Oklahoma City was bombed on April 19, 1995, many Americans
103
first blamed the tragedy on Middle Eastern terrorists. All cultures
have  outsiders who are likely to be blamed when something goes
wrong. This tendency to rely on traditional cultural narratives of
blame can subvert reformist efforts to fix blame on society itself or on
powerful  insiders within society. If  outsiders are to be blamed,
 insiders will feel little need to alter their behavior.
This is happening in the context of the criminalization of dowry
violence. It turns out that dowry violence is often blamed on either
the colonial or Western influence on Indian culture or on mothersin-law. These explanations for why dowry violence occurs provide
excuses and defenses for the victims husbands. They help us to
understand why, despite the reformers objectives of increasing
womens safety through the enactment of the Dowry Murder and
Cruelty statutes, the statutes have not significantly decreased the
amount of dowry violence to which women are subject. As already
indicated, the numbers of dowry deaths rose during the 1990s,104 the
police often refuse to investigate or they delay for too long to
105
conduct an effective investigation, and acquittal and withdrawal
106
rates have been high while conviction rates are extremely low.
These results should not be surprising if actors in the criminal justice
system and members of the larger society believe that dowry violence
is really a result of bad  outside influences or of the wrongful
actions of specific women in the family. Husbands and other family
members are unlikely to be convicted or even prosecuted if their
actions are viewed as excused due to the influence of external forces
or if they are not seen as the responsible individuals at all.
Commentators in the West have often blamed the custom of dowry
107
for the violence against and subordination of women in India.
103. See Michael Hedges, Terror in the Heartland, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1995, at A1
(reporting that experts in international terrorism are coordinating nationwide
efforts to find the terrorists, possibly of Middle Eastern descent, who were
responsible for the bombing of the Murrah Building in Oklahoma City); see also 2
Sought in Oklahoma Bombing, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 20, 1995, at A1 (reporting that a
Jordanian-American was being returned to the United States for questioning);
Heartland Horror, PRESS-E NTER. (Riverside, Cal.), Apr. 20, 1995, at A01 (reporting that
the FBI was looking for three people of Middle Eastern origin); Martin Fletcher &
Tom Rhodes, Up to 250 Missing in U.S. Bombing; Oklahoma Bomb, TIMES (London),
Apr. 20, 1995 (reporting that the FBI was concentrating their inquiries on the
Middle East), available at 1995 WL 7663248.
104. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 46-60 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
107. See Namratha S. Ravikant, Dowry Deaths: Proposing a Standard for Implementation

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2003

25

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 20
GREENBERG_PKFINAL

826

5/13/03 3:21 PM

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE L AW [Vol. 11:2

Since parents have to pay large dowries to the bridegrooms family
upon the marriage of their daughters, there is thought to be an
incentive to kill or abort female infants or provide insufficient
108
Similarly, Western commentators
medical care and education.
often portray women as valuable primarily for the dowries they bring
109
Once these have been collected, the
to their marital families.
women can be disposed of, perhaps to make room for another
dowried wife. According to the Western image of India, these  dowry
killings are accepted by traditional Indian society. Uma Narayan
and Ratna Kapur, in their discussions of this view, refer to the
Western understanding of dowry killings as being  death by
110
culture.
In contrast, some Indian commentators tie dowry
violence to British colonial rule and the effects of Western-style
conspicuous consumption in India. This reverses the Western claim
of  death by [Indian] culture, turning it into one of death by
Western culture.
Instead of the Western portrayal of dowry as evil, it can be
portrayed as a spiritual good. According to these accounts, dowry
111
ensured the sanctity of one form of traditional Hindu marriage. It
was the gift giving that gave a wedding its spiritual meaning. To
112
function in this way, the gift had to be voluntary. The most valuable
of Domestic Legislation in Accordance with Human Rights Obligations, 6 MICH. J. GENDER &
L. 449, 457-59 (2000) (arguing that dowry deaths are consistent with the inferior
position of women in Indian society, and that women are  socialized to think they
must submit to violence from their husbands); see also Anshu Nangia, The Tragedy of
Bride Burning in India: How Should the Law Address It?, 22 B ROOK. J. INTL L. 637, 64648 (1997) (arguing that the fact that dowry is still practiced in modern times is a
reflection of the patriarchal values embedded in Indian society); OLDENBURG, supra
note 73, at vii-viii (recounting that colleagues in the United States viewed an Indian
documentary on domestic violence as blaming the violence on dowry).
108. See Ravikant, supra note 107, at 457-58 (explaining, by contrast, that the male
is seen as an asset to the family because he can perform labor and provide for aging
parents).
109. See id. (arguing that the grooms family wants to find a bride who is willing to
support the grooms ambitions).
110. The phrase  death by culture is shorthand for the claim that the violence
against Third World women comes from particular cultural practices, and is
therefore different from and more exotic than the violence against women in the
United States. See Ratna Kapur, The Tragedy of Victimization Rhetoric: Resurrecting the
Native Subject in International/Post-Colonial Feminist Legal Politics, 15 HARV. HUM. R TS.
J. 1, 13-17 (2002) (arguing that while dowry murder is viewed as a cultural or
religious tradition, it is instead of modern origin); UMA N ARAYAN , DISLOCATING
CULTURES: IDENTITIES, TRADITIONS, AND THIRD WORLD F EMINISM 107 (1997) (arguing
that  dowry murder is neither Hindu nor a tradition ).
111. See SHEEL, supra note 97, at 19-20 (stating that in traditional society, the
practice of gift giving was approved from references in the Vedas and Smritis). Some
even claim that dowry was unknown in ancient Hindu communities.
112. See id. at 20.
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gift that one could give was the gift of a virgin bride. This practice
not only ensured the sanctity of the marriage, it also increased the
worthiness of both the giver and the recipient:  [H]e who gave a girl
in marriage according to the Brahma rite brought her into the world
114
of Brahman (after her death), and entered the world himself.
Others have seen the Indian practice of giving dowry as having
pure origins because they view it as having been a means of
protecting the brides rights in the property of her natal family.
These commentators connect dowry with the ancient practice of
stridhana.115 Stridhana was property that was provided to women upon
116
marriage as their share in their fathers estates. Under Hindu law,
women were not able to inherit from their fathers. Instead, they
received stridhana. Stridhana differed from the current dowry practice
in that the woman owned and controlled the stridhana. Dowry, in
117
contrast, is given to the husband and his family.
As one
commentator said,  Often, stridhana is depicted to glorify . . . the
118
better position of women in the Indian society.
Whether dowry is seen as having valid Hindu origins because it
sanctified marriage or because it provided women with a measure of
economic security, scholars like Ranjana Sheel and Veena Oldenburg
argue that the practice of giving dowry became much more
119
important as a result of Indias experience as a British colony. Prior
to the colonial period, different forms of marriage were associated
120
with the different castes and different geographical areas of India.
Although the higher castes engaged in rituals involving the giving of
a bride with dowry gifts, other castes recognized marriages consistent
with a host of other rituals including marriages in which the groom
121
would give gifts to the bride and her family.
113. See id. at 21 (explaining that the attitude in society makes it imperative for
girls to be married on grounds of purity).
114. Id. at 42.
115. See KUMARI, supra note 42, at 3 (referring dowry as streedhanam, which is a
form of inheritance); SHEEL, supra note 97, at 46 (describing stridhana as wealth given
to females at marriage).
116. See Nangia, supra note 107, at 640 (explaining that, in contrast to dowry,
stridhana is given as a personal gift and meant as a token of love).
117. See SHEEL, supra note 97, at 47-51 (citing a discussion of early Hindu texts
from 8th century B.C. through12th century A.D.)
118. Id. at 48.
119. See id. at 73-84 (discussing the colonial strategy universalizing the practice of
dowry as a necessary ingredient of Hindu marriage); OLDENBURG, supra note 73, at 1
(arguing that dowry as a force in gender crimes resulted from the collusion of
imperialism and Punjabi men who changed patriarchal ideas).
120. See SHEEL, supra note 97, at 72.
121. See id. at 40 (summarizing the eight rites/forms of marriage rituals). One of
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The British colonial government reinforced the high caste
marriage rituals, establishing a presumption that marriages
celebrated with other forms were not valid. In part, it did this
because of ideological distaste for the bride price form in which the
gifts pass from the groom to the brides family. In a 1909 case, the
court said,  Where the person who gives a girl in marriage receives
consideration for it, the substance of transaction makes it, according
to Hindu Law, not a gift but a sale of the girl. 122 Of course, the
dowry form of marriage can also be understood as the sale of a bride.
Whereas the British interpreted the bride price form as a purchase of
a bride by the groom for money given to the brides family, they
could just as easily have viewed the dowry form of marriage as the sale
of the bride by her family to the grooms family.123
The colonial governments presumption that valid Indian
marriages required dowry served a second purpose also: certainty. Its
administrative duties required it to be able to distinguish between
valid and invalid marriages. In order to do this, the colonial
government moved to standardize the customs associated with a valid
marriage and to create a system for identifying the essential rituals of
124
a marriage. Standardization was effectuated through the refusal to
recognize marriages that involved anything other than bestowing
125
both a bride and gifts on the family of the bridegroom. Thus, all
the other forms of marriage had to be rejected. In the early colonial
period, bride price marriages were still common among the lower
126
castes, as were other forms. In one case, the groom had kidnapped
the bride and then performed a marriage ceremony with her at the
home of another. This might have complied with the ancient
127
Rakshasa form, but the court rejected it on the grounds that the
the ancient Indian marriage rituals involved the abduction of the prospective bride.
Id. (describing the Rakshasa rite). In an ironic twist, the high cost of dowry weddings
has resulted in the reverse practice in northern Bihar where some families have
recently resorted to the abduction of grooms who are then married at gunpoint,
without dowry, to women in the family. See Sunita Singh, Marriages at Gunpoint:
Bihars Unique Response to Exorbitant Dowries, 125 MANUSHI 34 (2001) (describing 299
such marriages between 1995 and 2000).
122. See SHEEL, supra note 97, at 73 (quoting Chuni v. Suraj, I.L.R., (Bom.) 433
(1909)).
123. See id. at 74 (stating that such payment was necessary for marriage to take
place).
124. See id. (upholding the validity of the gift-giving of a daughter after her father
had died).
125. See id. at (classifying the bridegroom price as a Brahma marriage).
126. See id. at 78 (indicating the Chamars castes, which unlike upper castes, are
paying bride-price instead of dowry).
127. See id. at 40 (indicating this to be the forcible abduction form of marriage).
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court needed the authority to declare non-compliant marriages
128
void.
This process of standardization was furthered by the British
practice of relying on Hindu  experts to assist in the determination
of which marriages were valid. In an effort to be sensitive to local
custom, the British hired Brahmin (high caste) Indians to advise
them on the validity of marriages under the ancient traditions. These
advisors tended to be orthodox in their views and highly
129
This tendency reinforced the primacy of the most
conservative.
demanding forms of dowry weddings, although it did not avoid
disputes among the Hindu advisors as to exactly what the
requirements of religious law were. As one historian has noted,  The
fact of being native simultaneously privileged and devalued [the
advisors] as reliable sources.
The pundits were essential to
unlocking the scriptures for officials. But they were also believed by
officials to be the devious minority against which it was the mission
130
of colonization to protect the simple majority.
As a result of the
desire to standardize the marriage form and of the decision to rely on
high caste Hindus to authenticate marriages, the multiple forms of
Hindu marriage that existed at the beginning of the colonial period
131
had disappeared by the mid-twentieth century.
The colonizers
discredited all other marriage rituals leaving intact only the Brahmin
132
form which included dowry giving.
Many observers of the Indian marriage scene argue that Western
influence on the modern practice of dowry goes beyond the colonial
experience. They claim that dowries are used today as a means of
participating in a display of conspicuous consumption similar to that
which occurs in many Western countries. Traditionally, dowries
consisted of money, jewelry, and clothing for the bride. Elegant saris
and golden bracelets are typical examples, although in many cases
133
the gifts had only minor value.
128. Id. at 81 (refusing to recognize noncompliance, except for families of elites,
high castes or kings).
129. Id. at 68 (describing native pundits as clinging onto conventional, orthodox
views when  altered social conditions an established local customs demanded
departure from the ancient interpretations).
130. Lata Mani, Contentious Traditions: The Debate on Sati in Colonial India, in
R ECASTING WOMEN 88, 102 (Kumkum Sangari & Sudesh Vaid eds., 1989).
131. See SHEEL, supra note 97, at 72 (indicating from British ethnographic surveys
and census reports the obsolescence of all other forms of marriage except Brahma
and Asura).
132. See id. at 73 (stating that  the Brahma is the only legal form at present ).
133. See Ravikant, supra note 107, at 455 (exemplifying typical gifts involved in the
traditional, and outdated, dowry).
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Several commentators have suggested that some grooms families
today see dowry as a way of improving their economic status.134 This
has become particularly acute in the post-independence period
because middle income families have become the target of
consumerism and Western style advertising. For example, one
advertisement for a laundry detergent shows a man bursting into his
home furious (and abusive toward his wife) because he had a spot on
his shirt and was unable to make a sale. The advertised detergent
then works its magic, the man returns to the field, the sale is made,
and everyone is happy.135 Similarly, Indian advertisements often link
Hindu ceremonies with consumption, conveying the implicit message
136
Ranjana Kumari argues that as the
that to consume is Indian.
middle class has become increasingly the target of advertising, this
has created an  insatiable greed and a desire to  keep up with the
137
Joneses.
This position is reinforced by Arvind Rajagopals study of
advertising showing that whereas advertising aimed at the lower castes
used to lecture about the products utility, today it is aimed at the
138
Not surprisingly, consumer items are often
creation of desire.
139
advertised particularly for a brides dowry.
Today, dowries often
include home appliances, furniture, scooters (a common means of
134. See Barbara Harriss-White, Gender Cleansing, in SIGNPOSTS: GENDER ISSUES IN
POST-INDEPENDENCE INDIA 124, 142 (Rajeswari Sunder Rajan ed., 1999) (arguing that
the dowry, along with ceremonies revolving around the girls reproductive cycle, are
a way for the grooms family to show upward movement in society); KUMARI, supra
note 42, at 35-38 (discussing the newly affluent middle class business community);
Laurel Remers Pardee, The Dilemma of Dowry Deaths: Domestic Disgrace or International
Human Rights Catastrophe?, 13 A RIZ. J. INTL & COMP. L. 491, 498 (1996) (arguing that
greed and extreme poverty lead grooms to demand dowries).
135. See Arvind Rajagopal, Thinking about the New Indian Middle Class, in SIGNPOSTS:
GENDER ISSUES IN POST-INDEPENDENCE INDIA 88-89 (Rajeswari Sunder Rajan ed., 2001)
(arguing that the melodramatic nature of the advertisement reflects an attempt to
get into the heads of lower class consumers, to whom questions of survival are a
much greater part of life).
136. See id. at 65-66 (arguing that there are four ways that ads make this link: by
promoting consumption during Hindu festivals; by discussing emotions surrounding
religious festivals, thus linking religion and consumption; by using religious symbols;
and by using religious fetishes and symbols of good luck).
137. See KUMARI, supra note 42, at 37.
138. See Rajagopal, supra note 135, at 69, 79 (showing that television forced
advertisers to switch from using different marketing techniques for wealthy and lower
income people to using the same selling techniques for both groups). Thus, whereas
before advertisers marketed the aesthetics of a product to the wealthy and the utility
of the product to those of lower income, now they market aesthetics to both groups.
Id.
139. See KUMARI, supra note 42, at 15 (indicating that offering bank loans and
consumer items as the ideal dowry arises from the onset of consumerism and
materialism).
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transportation), clothing for the groom and his family, and money.
A brides family may well spend several times its annual income on a
141
daughters dowry, creating enormous economic hardship for them.
Thus, what may have started as a ritual for sanctifying marriage has,
according to this way of seeing things, become, as a result of the
colonial experience and contact with Western consumerism, a
142
 sordid commercial transaction.
In addition to blaming the colonial government and Western
consumerism for dowry violence, women, specifically mothers-in-law,
143
Again, placing the blame here means that one
are often blamed.
can imagine developing remedies for the problem of dowry violence
without attacking the more basic problem of young brides
subordination within the family or even other forms of violence that
enforce womens subordinate position. Mothers-in-law, in Indian
family mythology, are often evil actors. Thus, they are easy to blame.
Criminal action against them fits easily with cultural understandings
of who mothers-in-law are and does not challenge traditional patterns
of male dominance. In many ways, mothers-in-law play, within India,
roles that are similar to the ones that stepmothers play in United
States family mythology. They are frequently portrayed as overdrawn
exaggerated characters with evil hearts.144
Marriages in India are often exogamous, meaning that the bride
moves away from her community to live with the groom and his
145
Just as a twofamily; this is particularly true in northern India.
parent family with children is the imagined familial norm in the
United States, so in India is the joint family in which the newly
married couple lives with the grooms parents. But, just as the twoparent family in the United States does not describe all actual
families, so the reality for many people in India differs from the joint
140. Id. at 47.
141. See id. (showing that families may even spend over ten times their income on
dowries); B LOCH & R AO, supra note 36, at 5 (finding that dowries averaged six times
the annual income of the brides parents in the community studied).
142. See KUMARI, supra note 42, at 1.
143. See Rani Jethmalani & Shally Prasad, Internalizing Patriarchy, in KALIS YUG:
E MPOWERMENT, L AW AND DOWRY DEATHS 139 (Rani Jethmalani ed., 1995) (alleging
that mothers-in-law are often held responsible for dowry murders).
144. See, e.g., A NITA R AU B ADAMI, THE HEROS WALK 222 (2001) (depicting, in this
novel, a mother-in-law who despite her age dominates the whole family without a
thought for anything except her own comfort and power). Although her age has
made her dependent physically on her daughter-in-law, the old woman still believed,
 Daughters in law were crooks. . . . They stole power from you before you knew what
was happening. Id.
145. See Billig, supra note 41, at 346 (explaining that such movement is due to the
fact that most castes in North Indian villages are composed of only one clan).
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The image of the typical Indian joint family includes a
family.
mother-in-law who dominates the multi-generational family,
enforcing compliance with her petty whims and looking to pick a
fight with anyone who challenges her. Furthermore, although the
husband of the abused woman may be the undisputed head of the
household, especially if he is the only adult male, his mother holds
147
significant power over his wife.
Accounts of dowry violence frequently focus on the role of the
mother-in-law. Often the mother-in-law is depicted as initially making
impossible demands on the daughter-in-law and then punishing
noncompliance with violence. In these portrayals, the mother-in-law
is sometimes shown as the major source of the violence against the
148
victim. One well-known example is the case of Sudha Goel. Within
a month of her marriage, she was harassed by her mother-in-law,
husband, and brother-in-law for having brought an inadequate
149
dowry. She was also physically abused in that she was expected to
150
do more housework than she could possibly accomplish.
This
particular form of abuse would be attributable to the mother-in-law.
Then, when she was a full nine months pregnant, she was killed by a
kitchen  accident in which kerosene from the stove got on her sari
151
and caught fire.
Immediately after the fire and before she died,
Sudha Goel looked at her mother-in-law and told the neighbors,
152
 This lady has put kerosene oil on me and set me ablaze.
Although Sudha Goels husband was also found responsible for her
death, one account of the Supreme Courts opinion notes that the
witnesses testimony was deemed plausible because of its description
146. See JAIN , supra note 36, at 23 (providing proof that joint families may be the
exception, rather than the rule, for a significant portion of the Indian population,
and that one study showed that only 58% of male respondents and 50% of female
respondents actually lived in joint families); JOANNA L IDDLE & R AMA JOSHI,
DAUGHTERS OF INDEPENDENCE: GENDER, CASTE AND CLASS IN INDIA 142-43 (1986)
(showing that 60% of the highly educated, professional women studied who all lived
in Delhi were living in nuclear families; that 21% were living in family structures that
were neither nuclear nor joint; and that only 19% were living in joint families). This
study even questions the prevalence of joint family structures in North India where
they are supposed to be dominant. Id. at 142.
147. See Bush, supra note 24, at 591 (arguing that family power is based on age and
gender).
148. See Rani Jethmalani & P. K. Dey, Dowry Deaths and Access to Justice, in KALIS
YUG: E MPOWERMENT, L AW AND DOWRY DEATHS 51-60 (Rani Jethmalani ed., 1995)
(explaining that this was the first dowry death case for which the death penalty was
given).
149. Id. at 52.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 53.
152. Id.
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of the mother-in-laws indifference to the sight of the young wife
engulfed in flames. The Court was ready to believe that a mother-in153
law might indeed act in this way.
The story of Santara Singh follows a similar pattern. Santara
Singhs in-laws began harassing her for dowry money shortly after her
marriage.  Why dont you go home and get 50,000 rupees, her
mother-in-law is quoted as saying to her.  Otherwise well throw
kerosene on you. When Santara Singh was unable to produce the
money, her mother-in-law is reported to have carried out the threat
and poured kerosene on her. Luckily for Santara Singh, she was able
154
As
to flee from her in-laws home before the match could be lit.
155
Isabel Marcus has noted, these stories follow a script. For Marcus,
an American law professor, the interesting feature is the way in which
violence in the home is considered ordinary and unremarkable when
it is in an American home, but becomes  exotic,  uncivilized, and
156
a form of terror when it occurs in foreign societies. The script that
I want to focus on is the one that includes the evil mother-in-law. Just
as the foreignness makes the violence visible to Americans, so the role
of the mother-in-law may make it easier for Indian society to
recognize it and talk about it.
Not surprisingly, actual court cases also often display a tendency to
157
blame the mother-in-law. The case of Prem Singh v. State of Haryana
is a good example. In this case, Sumitra, wife of Prem Singh and
daughter-in-law of Shanti, complained to her father within days of
her marriage that she was being harassed and taunted for having
brought insufficient dowry into the family. Sumitras parents did give
her in-laws some additional presents and, when the harassment and
abuse continued, a mutual friend tried to mediate by talking to Prem
Singh directly. Approximately two years after her marriage, Sumitra
suffered burn injuries. While in the hospital, she complained again
to her parents about dowry abuse. Within a few days she died,
perhaps from having consumed poison.
153. See id. at 57 (finding that if the mother-in-law really wanted the victim to have
the child, she would have been upset to see her die so close to the babys due date);
Sandanshiv & Mathew, supra note 72 (recounting that in another case, the
prosecutors chose to prosecute only the mother-in-law, despite evidence that the
deceaseds sister-in-law could also have been responsible for the womans death).
154. Molly Moore, Consumerism Fuels Dowry-Death Wave; Bride Burnings on the Increase
in India, WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 1995, at A35.
155. See Isabel Marcus, Reframing Domestic Violence: Terrorism in the Home, in THE
PUBLIC N ATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE 11, 13 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Roxanne
Mykitiuk eds., 1994) (recognizing a pattern in dowry deaths).
156. Id. at 12.
157. A.I.R. (1998) S.C. 2628.
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One interesting thing about the India Supreme Courts opinion in
this case is that, like the description above, it does not indicate exactly
who did the abusing and harassing of Sumitra. Despite the fact that
Shanti, the mother-in-law, is never mentioned in the Courts
description of the facts, she was charged under Section 304B with
having caused Sumitras death. Her son, Prem Singh, was also
charged. The trial court acquitted them both, but the state supreme
court, the High Court, reversed the acquittals and convicted them
both. The India Supreme Court then affirmed the conviction of
Prem Singh, the victims husband, but acquitted Shanti, the motherin-law, on the grounds that there was no evidence that she had
treated Sumitra badly. According to the Supreme Court, Shanti did
not live with Sumitra and Prem Singh, was not with them at the time
of Sumitras death, and would not have benefited from the payment
of any additional dowry. If this is the case, why was Shanti initially
charged and convicted by the High Court? It is only possible to
speculate on an answer, but it may be that the script that attributes
primary responsibility for the dowry violence to the evil mother-in-law
is so firmly embedded in the Indian narrative of how these tragedies
occur that neither the prosecutors nor the lower court could let go of
it. The story of dowry violence so frequently involves a mother-in-law
as the most significant perpetrator of the abuse that it may be difficult
for prosecutors, judges, and others to believe that she is not
responsible at least in a behind-the-scenes manner.158
A quick review of a number of court opinions indicates that dowry
159
In many cases, numerous
violence is typically a family affair.
members of the grooms immediate family participate in dowry
violence over a period of many years. However, the fact that these
cases involve convictions of multiple members of the grooms family
indicates that the mother-in-law is probably not any more responsible
for the violence than the others who are also convicted.
Furthermore, as in most countries, familial violence in India
frequently takes the form of rape or other sexual abuse of the wife.160
158. See also Wazir Chand v. State of Haryana, A.I.R. (1989) S.C. 378 (acquitting
the mother-in-law but convicting the husband and father-in-law).
159. See, e.g., Agarwal v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. (1997) S.C. 1830 (charging and
convicting husband, brother-in-law, and mother-in-law for the death of twenty-eight
year old Kiran Devi); Asokan v. State, A.I.R. (2000) S.C. 3444 (charging the husband,
brother-in-law, mother-in-law and father-in-law for causing the murder of Porkodi,
and convicting all but the brother-in-law, who was acquitted); Ravinder v. State of
Andhra Pradesh, A.I.R. (1991) S.C. 1142 (charging and convicting husband, fatherin-law and mother-in-law).
160. See Mary Anne Weaver, Gandhis Daughters, N EW YORKER, Jan. 10, 2000, at 52
(noting that 70% of all rape cases in India involve rapes that occur within the
family).
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This is a form of violence for which mothers-in-law are likely to be less
responsible than other family members.
There is also some evidence that mothers-in-law, instead of
instigating violence, may reduce the level of abuse that their
daughters-in-law experience at the hands of other family members.
This is illustrated by the story of Ms. Harjit, who initially lived in a
161
After the in-laws
joint family with her husband and his parents.
moved away, her husbands abuse of her increased. Eventually, she
fled to her in-laws home. Although life with her in-laws was not
wonderful she had to leave when they tried to marry off her
daughters in ways she did not like it was better than life with her
husband. Ms. Harjit stayed with her in-laws for ten years. Similarly,
one study of 120 college-educated, professional women from Delhi
found that although most of them did not live in joint families, the
women indicated that many of their mothers-in-law treated them the
162
same as the older women treated their own daughters. Indeed, one
study found that women in nuclear families are abused at a 50% rate,
163
while only 30% of women in joint families are abused. This would
imply that life with ones in-laws may be protective for wives.
My point is not to attribute blame for dowry violence to particular
family members nor is it to absolve others of blame. It is likely that
colonialism, Western consumerism, and mothers-in-law all bear some
responsibility for the dowry practices and violence of modern India.
Instead, I am arguing that the criminalization of dowry violence
encourages the search for socially-marginalized people and for
external forces that can be blamed for activities that have been
declared to be socially reprehensible. Whatever responsibility may
appropriately be placed on these people and forces, the current legal
discussion tends to obscure the role of the men who dominate the
family structure. Furthermore, blaming mothers-in-law, colonialism
and consumerism all of which are already viewed as  evil  makes
fundamental change in family power relationships appear
unnecessary. In this way, criminal laws that were originally seen as a
tool for change lose their reformist edge.

161. See MAHAJAN & MADHURIMA, supra note 42, at 51-54.
162. See L IDDLE & JOSHI, supra note 146, at 146 (demonstrating how mothers-inlaws treat their sons wives in  new joint families).
163. See Visaria, supra note 36, at 11 (referring to psychological and physical
abuse); see also Govind, supra note 98 (noting that Kerala women from nuclear
households are more likely to be abused than those from non-nuclear households).
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V. PROBLEM F OUR : CRIMINAL L AW IS INDIVIDUALISTIC IN N ATURE
Criminal law makes a public statement that a particular prohibited
activity is anti-social. Criminal laws that target domestic violence or
even dowry violence announce that those practices, which previously
were considered private problems (at best) or non-problematic (at
worst), are problems worthy of the attention of public officials and
public resources. This is an important statement. However, while
they do this, laws that criminalize domestic violence often fail to
recognize that the problem is systemic and not just individual.
Criminal law focuses on individual wrong-doing, not on
problematic social structures. Thus, prosecutions for dowry violence
charge particular individuals, not whole segments of society, with
violating social norms. Similarly, criminal prosecutions assume a
victim who is initially able to bring the offenses to the attention of the
appropriate public officials and is then able to persevere with the
prosecution. As anthropologist Sally Merry says, the criminal law
offers victims of domestic violence the  promise of liberal
legalism. 164 For many women around the world, this is an empty
promise. For a variety of reasons, their ties to their families are too
strong and their alternatives too unattractive for them to go forward,
alone, with a criminal prosecution.
The institution of marriage and the marital family are particularly
important to Indian women. It is considered a disgrace to a womans
165
natal family if a woman is unmarried past marriageable age. In the
1980s, the average age of marriage for Indian women was 18.4; in
166
some rural areas of Rajasthan it was 15.8. Although it has crept up
167
since then, the relatively early marriage age and the emphasis on
the necessity of marriage for women mean that for natal families, one
of the major obligations to daughters is to find an appropriate
168
husband. For many families, marriage is a religious obligation. A
164. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 11, at 52 (2000) (stating that such promise is
disconnected from the realities of womens lives because this  connection with the
legal system is inadequate).
165. See B ADAMI, supra note 144 (telling the story that a brother is aware of his
failure in his duty to his sister in not finding her a husband); SHEEL, supra note 97, at
18 (stating that a  brides family either reluctantly or eagerly complies with gift
demands primarily because of the socio-cultural stigma attached to keeping the girl
in parental house beyond the marriageable age ).
166. See Billig, supra note 41, at 344 (noting the low mean age of marriage for
females in India and particularly the state of Rajasthan).
167. See MEDICAL COMPUTER SOC. OF INDIA, A VERAGE MARRIAGE A GE (last visited Jan.
19, 2003) (noting that in 1991, nineteen years old was the average age at marriage
for women in India), available at http://www.medindia.net/health_statistics/
general/marriageage.asp.
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girls purpose in life is to become a wife and mother.
Since marriage is such an important part of Indian womens
identity, it is often especially difficult for them to escape from violent
marriages. Abused womens natal families frequently feel unable to
help. Some parents feel that their major responsibility to their
daughter is to secure a marriage for her. Once this is accomplished,
their obligations toward her are ended. Folk wisdom claims that
Hindu parents tell their daughter as they leave for her wedding that
now she will enter her husbands home, and she is not to leave it,
170
except for her own funeral. The married daughter who wishes to
return permanently to her parents home often recognizes that she
will no longer receive the love, honor and respect that she enjoyed
171
there earlier. Parents who respond this way to their own daughters
violent marriages may be reacting to the same social pressures faced
by everyone. If their daughter returns home, they will now have to
care for her in addition to the extended families of their sons to
whom they have committed themselves. Often it is the abused
womans brothers and their wives who are particularly resentful of
172
her return home.
Furthermore, if the victim of abuse has
unmarried younger sisters, her return home is likely to seriously
173
complicate their marriage prospects. As a result, for many abused
women, a permanent return to their natal families is not likely to be a
174
possibility.
168. See Billig, supra note 41, at 348 (indicating that the common preference is for
a woman to marry into a family of her own status or into one that is of higher status).
169. See MAHAJAN & MADHURIMA, supra note 42, at 58.
170. See Mahajan, supra note 35, at 8.
171. See Jethmalani & Prasad, supra note 143, at 146 (stating that new brides
cannot return to their natal homes because  from the moment a young womans
marriage is negotiated, her parents condition her to serve her in-laws, sacrificing her
own likes and dislikes ); Madhu Kishwar, When Homes are Torture Chambers [An
Interview with Celine Suguna of Vimochana], 110 MANUSHI (1999) (viewing daughters
who return to their natal homes as liabilities), available at http://free.freespeech.
org/manushi/110/vimochana.html.
172. See Kishwar, supra note 171 (stating that resentment of a new brides return to
her family comes from both her sisters-in-law and her brothers because of the
additional responsibilities she imposes); MITRA, supra note 33, at 10 (stating that an
abused woman is often considered a burden at her parents home and likely to be
beaten by her own brothers).
173. See Flavia, Violence in the Family: Wife Beating, in WOMEN IN INDIAN SOCIETY 151,
157-58 (Rehana Ghadially ed., 1988) (noting how an abused woman could not
return to her natal family because she had two younger sisters, and it would be too
hard to find husbands for them if she remained at home).
174. See OLDENBURG, supra note 73, at 183-200 (providing examples of parents who
respond to the discovery of their daughters abuse by acting to remove her).
Naturally, there are many parents who come to their daughters aid. I have heard
and read individual stories of parents doing their utmost to help their daughters
leave abusive marriages and to provide for them subsequently.
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Nor is there any place in much of Indian society for an unmarried
adult woman. Divorce, although legal, is not an option.175 In 1991,
176
the divorce rate was 0.3%
Women who leave their husbands
homes are often forced by social pressures to return. For example,
the well-known feminist Flavia Agnes tells the story of Prema, who
177
fled from her husbands home to live with a friend.
Immediately,
the walls of the factory where she worked were covered with signs
saying that she was a slut who had run off with another man. Prema
was forced to work alone and spent most of her time crying. She did
not even try to get a divorce. By the end of two years, the social
pressure was so great that she returned to her husband. Not only was
her life miserable, but her daughter was approaching her early teens
and Prema knew she would not be able to find a husband for the
178
child if she herself remained separated from her own husband.
When Prema left her husband, she had to move in with a friend.
This was uncomfortable and contributed to her return to her
husband because the apartment was overcrowded with the addition
179
Lack of housing is a major problem
of Prema and her daughter.
for women who would like to leave their husbands homes. For
example, in 1997, only 0.03% of the budget of the Social Welfare
180
Board of Madhya Pradesh was used to support shelters for women.
One study reported that nearly one-third of abused women had
considered fleeing from their husbands, but had decided against
doing so because they had nowhere to go and were afraid they would
181
have to leave their children behind.
Womens economic position in India makes it very difficult for
most women to leave their husbands. Only 22% of women are
182
Most Indian workers,
employed, as compared with 52% of men.
175. See id.
176. See B LOCH & R AO, supra note 36, at 5. As in many countries, the divorce rate
in India varies widely in different geographical areas. One article claims that the
divorce rate has reached a  scary 30% in metropolitan India. See Neelu Kang,
Marriages Caught in a Whirlpool of Stress, TRIB. (India), Jan. 13, 2002, at
http://www.tribuneindia.com/2002/20020113/herworld.htm#1.
177. See Flavia, supra note 173, at 158 (recounting the story of a working woman
named Prema who faced social difficulties after leaving her husband).
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. See Mitra, supra note 46, at 23 (reporting also that 6.9% of the Boards budget
was allocated to counseling services.) These funds usually support efforts to
encourage the abused woman to return to her husband. See supra notes 48-52 and
accompanying text.
181. Conclusion, in A SUMMARY R EPORT OF THREE STUDIES 42 (1999).
182. See INDIA AT A GLANCE: WORK PARTICIPATION R ATES, 1991 CENSUS OF INDIA,
available at http://www.censusindia.net/workpart.html.; see also Steady Growth in
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The
male or female, are employed in the agricultural sector.
Indian census divides agricultural workers into three categories:
cultivators, laborers, and other. Cultivators usually have some
ownership rights to the land and frequently direct or supervise the
184
work of others, while laborers work on anothers land for wages.
More than half of the female agricultural workers are laborers but
185
only one-third of male workers are.
Female agricultural laborers
are likely to be working on family farms in which they do not have a
property interest, in contrast to men working the same farms who
probably do have an ownership or leasehold interest. Furthermore,
the agricultural laborer positions are lower-skilled and more poorly
186
paid than the cultivator positions.
Even in laborer positions,
187
women are usually paid only 40% to 60% of what men earn.
Consistent with this, experts estimate that as many as 90% of working
188
women toil in the informal, undocumented sector.
Again, these
189
jobs are unskilled, low paying and do not provide benefits. Nor is
life easy for Indian women with professional educations. One study
found that even these women believe that they are discriminated
against in the workplace and must work harder than men to receive
190
comparable benefits. The result is that most women are unable to
support themselves apart from their husbands.
The criminal law does not help women to cope with these social
difficulties. Instead, a woman who invokes its protection would be
left to fend for herself. She would be forced to turn to her own
parents for assistance. If they are unable or unwilling to help, she
may have very few options for survival. As a result, it is not likely that
women will report the violence that they suffer to criminal

Womens Employment (citing HINDU, Oct. 22, 2000) (womens employment is 16.3% of
employment in the organized sector), available at http://www.indiasocial.org/
result.asp?id=1351.
183. See JOHN E. DUNLOP & VICTORIA A. VELKOFF, B UREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
DEPT OF COMM., WOMEN AND THE E CONOMY IN INDIA (1999) (showing that 63% of
male workers and 81% of female workers are employed in the agricultural sector),
available at http://www.census.gov/ipc/prod/wid-9802.pdf.
184. See id. (pinpointing the differences between cultivators and agricultural
laborers).
185. See id.
186. See id.
187. See id.
188. See id. (stating that women in the undocumented sector plow fields, harvest
crops, weave, make handicrafts, sell food, gather wood, etc.).
189. See id.
190. See id. (stating that nearly two-thirds of the women in the study felt compelled
to work harder to receive comparable benefits).
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The vast underreporting of domestic abuse that is
authorities.
described above is undoubtedly due in part to womens overall
subordination, both economically and within the family. Until
women have options outside of their marital families, we should not
be surprised that they choose to stay in violent relations instead of
leaving for lives of economic oppression and social ostracism.
CONCLUSION
Criminal law is a flawed vehicle for reducing the level of domestic
violence in India for multiple reasons. This is particularly true of the
current system which focuses primarily on dowry-related violence.
First, criminal law relies for its implementation on a police force and
a judiciary that have often not understood the dynamics of family
violence. As a result, instead of taking the initiative to investigate
incidents and arrest the abusers, the police have often encouraged
women to return to their homes to work out the problem. This does
nothing to change the power dynamics within the home because the
police have not traditionally seen the problem as one of power
dynamics. Courts have also misunderstood the motivating factors in
violent relations and have interpreted the statutes as if individual
incidents of assault are not part of a larger mechanism for asserting
and maintaining control over the victimized spouse. This means that
courts do not look at all of the relevant evidence and therefore fail to
invoke the available presumption about who caused the death. The
courts misunderstanding of the dynamics of domestic violence
actually undercuts their ability to enforce the criminal laws which
were meant to attack exactly the problem of such violence.
Second, the statutes focus on making a clear statement of the evils
of dowry violence has left other forms of domestic violence in an
ambiguous position. Presumably few Indians advocate the beating of
192
193
However, such violence certainly occurs.
The courts
wives.
interpretations of the anti-dowry violence criminal laws has often
resulted in making action against non-dowry violence less likely.
Instead of defining  cruelty broadly, the courts have often defined it
in restrictive ways that require extreme injury before the statute can
be used. This means that much non-dowry violence will be hard to
194
prosecute. It also means that the police are likely to view non-dowry
191. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
192. Nevertheless, many people in India believe that husbands are privileged by
the fact of their marriage to beat their wives. See supra notes 96-100 and
accompanying text.
193. See id.
194. In the United States most domestic violence involves comparatively low levels
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violence as not covered by the statute. This provides yet another
reason for them to recommend to the victimized wife that she return
home and try to work things out with her husband and his family.
The police and the courts tendency to understand domestic
violence in terms of individuals maladjustment to marriage and the
over-emphasis on dowry violence at the expense of the more general
phenomenon of domestic violence open the way for blaming dowry
violence on forces or people that are not central to the structure of a
marriage. Accusing colonialism, consumerism, and mothers-in-law of
instigating dowry violence means that one can imagine reducing
dowry violence without changing the gendered power dynamics that
currently result in wives inability to end the violence against them.
Although colonialism may have strengthened mens position in
195
marriage and in the family, the colonial period itself has long since
ended and domestic violence continues. Furthermore, we must be
very careful because efforts to blame consumerism can easily be
converted into platforms for family values that call for women to
196
remain subordinated in the home. Blaming mothers-in-law simply
disempowers older women without helping the younger ones.
Finally, the criminal law is an unlikely vehicle for creating
significant change in the power relations within families because it
relies on the powerless to take control in situations in which they
have almost no alternatives to disempowerment. If neither the
police, the courts, nor their own natal families are likely to come to
their aid and if there are few opportunities for them to live
independently, how can one expect victims of domestic violence to
jeopardize their already threatened positions within their marital
families in order to invoke the sanctions of the criminal law?
Certainly, we must offer something more than this.
Of course, one solution is to improve the overall position of women
in India. This is crucial. This includes providing more education to

of violence that would not be subject to prosecution if major injuries were required.
See B UREAU OF JUST. STATS., U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE AND
A GE OF VICTIM, 1993-1999 2 (2001) (indicating that approximately two-thirds of
violent crimes against female intimate partners are simple assaults as opposed to
rape/sexual assault, robberty, or aggravated assault..
195. See OLDENBURG, supra note 73, at 1 (suggesting that the collusion of
colonialism and Punjabi men reconfigured patriarchial values and manly ideals ever
more strongly).
196. See, e.g., Murli Manohar Joshi, Womens Liberation: The Indian Way (Dec. 24,
1995) (statement by one commentator for the Bharatiya Janata Party, a major Hindu
nationalist party in India, contrasting western consumer values with the focus on lifelong relationships and the respect for husband and wife in India), available at
http://www.bjp.org/major/mmj-wlib.html.
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women, better employment opportunities, additional opportunities
for independent living, and the chance to participate in the political
system. Changes in these areas of society and the economy will
provide women with choices that may favorably affect the patterns of
subordination that currently make it difficult to reduce the levels of
violence that women face. Women may even have better chances to
participate in the political system. However, these changes, even if
they are essential to improving womens situations, are beyond the
scope of this Article.
What changes in the legal system might hold more promise for
abused women than the criminal remedies have so far? There are at
least two current initiatives in India. The first is a campaign to create
a civil restraining order regime that would provide remedies without
reliance on the criminal justice system and the second is a series of
efforts at training the police and judiciary in issues relating to gender
equality including the problems of domestic violence. Both of these
are actively supported by groups within the Indian womens
movement.
Beginning in December 1999, the Lawyers Collective, Womens
Rights Initiative ( LCWRI ) began an effort to develop new
legislation on domestic violence without any limitation to, or focus on
198
After nationwide conversations, the LCWRI
dowry violence.
developed a bill that would permit the courts to issue a civil order
197. See CENSUS OF INDIA, PROVISIONAL POPULATION TOTALS: INDIA, CENSUS OF
INDIA, 2001 (last visited Jan. 20, 2003) (reporting 2001 census data showing 54%
female versus 76% male literacy), available at http://www.censusindia.net/
results/resultsmain.html. The 2001 figures represent a significant improvement over
the 1991 figures which showed a female literacy rate of only 39% and a male literacy
rate of 64%. CENSUS OF INDIA, N UMBER OF L ITERATES AND L ITERACY R ATES (last visited
Apr. 11, 2003), available at http://www.censusindia.net/literates1.html. The 1991
figures in turn showed an imporvement over past censuses. In 1971, only 22% of
women and 46% of men were literate. Victoria A. Welkoff, Womens Education in
India (l998), available at http://www.census.gov/ipc/prod/wid-9801.pdf. for more
information on the history of womens education in post-colonial India, see Aparna
Basu, Womens Education in India: Achievements and Challenges, in F ROM INDEPENDENCE
TOWARDS F REEDOM: INDIAN WOMEN SINCE 1947 135 (Bharati Ray & Aparna Basu eds.,
1999).
There is tremendous regional variation in literacy rates, with Kerala having a female
literacy rate of 86% and Bihar and Uttar Pradesh having rates of 30%. Velkoff, supra.
In 1993, 61% of girls or primary school age were attending school, compared to 75%
of boys. Girls are much more likely to be taken out of school to help with family
responsibilities, or, when they reach puberty, to protect their honor. As a result, the
proportion of girls attending school decreases with age, while it remains stable for
boys. In 1993, only 13% of all Indian women had more than a primary school
education. Id.
198. See L AWYERS COLLECTIVE, WOMEN S R IGHTS INITIATIVE PROPOSAL: THE
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE A GAINST WOMEN (PREVENTION ) B ILL, 2001 (permitting courts to
grant orders to protect victims of domestic violence).
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requiring the abuser to stop the violence. This is similar to the
199
protective order regimes that exist in the United States. However,
the bills authors carefully tailored their proposed statute so that it
recognizes the particular difficulties faced by victims of domestic
violence within Indias particular system of subordination of women.
First, the definition of domestic violence includes not just physical
and sexual abuse, but also economic abuse.200 Furthermore, since, as
indicated above, married women in India usually have very limited
opportunities to earn a satisfactory living on their own and no claim
on their natal families for assistance, the bill provides that the victim
should be able to remain in the marital residence even after the
201
petition for protection is granted.
The proposal also allows the
199. See Barbara Hart, State Codes on Domestic Violence: Analysis, Commentary and
Recommendations, excerpted in CLARE DALTON & E LIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, B ATTERED
WOMEN AND THE L AW 512-15 (2001) (describing the variety of state restraining order
regimes). For a discussion of the effectiveness of restraining orders in the United
States, see Adele Harrell & Barbara E. Smith, Effects of Restraining Orders on Domestic
Violence Victims, in DO A RRESTS AND R ESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 214 (Eve S. Buzawa &
Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1996).
200. See L AWYERS COLLECTIVE, WOMEN S R IGHTS INITIATIVE: CAMPAIGN FOR A CIVIL
L AW ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 7 (last visited Mar. 17, 2003), available at http://www.
learningpartnership.org/events/newsalerts/india0202/compare_bills.pdf.
This
article explains that  economic abuse includes:
a) deprivation of any or all economic or financial resources to which the
person aggrieved is entitled . . . including but not limited to household
necessities . . . stridhan, property, jointly or separately owned by the person
aggrieved, payment of rental related to the shared household and
maintenance;
b) disposal of household effects . . . valuables, shares, securities . . . or other
property in which the person aggrieved has an interest or is entitled to use
by virtue of the domestic relationship . . . ; or,
c) prohibiting or restricting continued access to resources or facilities which
the person aggrieved is entitled to use or enjoy by virtue of the domestic
relationship including access to the shared household.
Id.
201. See L AWYERS COLLECTIVE, WOMEN S R IGHTS INITIATIVE PROPOSAL: THE
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE A GAINST WOMEN (PREVENTION ) B ILL, 2001, § 3 (last visited Mar.
17, 2003) (stating under the rights of an aggrieved person,  every woman in a
domestic relationship shall have the right to reside in the shared household . . .
[and] not to be evicted or excluded from the same . . . . ), available at http://www.
learningpartnership.org/events/newalerts/india0202/lcwri_proposedbill.pdf.
In
addition, section 7 of the bill provides:
The court may pass a residence order to:
i) restrain the respondent form alienating or dispossessing the shared
household or encumbering the same;
ii) restrain the respondent from renouncing his rights int he shared
household except in favour of the person aggrieved;
iii) require the respondent to permit the person aggrieved to enter and
remain in the shared household or part thereof;
iv) prohibit, suspend or restrict the exercise by the respondent of his right to
occupy the shared household;
v) restrain the respondent from dispossessing the aggrieved person from
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court to order the payment of maintenance for the victim of violence
202
and her children. These provisions are a start in creating economic
rights for abused women, especially if courts can be convinced to
grant maintenance payments that continue throughout the womans
life and that are large enough for her to support herself and her
children.
Enactment of the proposal would provide some
entitlements which clearly belong to her, not to her husband or his
family. Finally, the proposal provides that the court may grant
temporary custody of any children to the victim.203 This would have
the effect of challenging the abusers power and control over the
family.
Furthermore, the proposal begins to recognize societys
responsibility for the fact that women occupy a position in which they
can be victimized. The proposal would allow someone other than the
victim perhaps a friend or NGO to bring the petition on the victims
behalf, with the consent of the victim.204 The bill also calls for the
appointment of a Coordinator for the Prevention of Domestic
Violence to investigate issues relating to domestic violence in general
205
and complaints about the implementation of the law in particular.
Although neither of these provisions expressly acknowledges societys
role in enabling the violence, they implicitly recognize that systemic
changes in the balance of power are necessary if victimization of
206
women within their families is to stop.
Unfortunately, the bill that the government introduced into the
Lok Sabha, Indias Parliament, was so different from the one
proposed by the womens groups that the womens organizations
207
The government bill
ultimately ended up opposing its passage.
the shared household; and
vi) direct the respondent to secure alternate accommodation for the person
aggrieved or to pay rent for the same, if for sufficient reasons, the court is of
the opinion that it will be harmful or injurious for the person aggrieved to
live with the erspondent in the shared household, having regard to the
circumstances of the case.
Id. § 7.
202. See id. § 6 (directing monetary relief).
203. See id. § 8 (outlining custody order).
204. See id. § 12 (permitting petition by next friend).
205. See id. § 34 (establishing the duty of government to ensure effective
implentation of the act).
206. See L AWYERS COLLECTIVE, WOMEN S R IGHTS INITIATIVE PROPOSAL: THE
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE A GAINST WOMEN (PREVENTION ) B ILL, 2001, 2 (last visited Mar. 17,
2003) (stating in the Preamble  domestic violence has operated as a severe form of
oppression of women. . . . ), available at http://www.learningpartnership.org/
events/newalerts/india0202/lcwri_proposedbill.pdf.
207. See B ILL JUSTIFYING B ATTERY INTRODUCED ON WOMEN S DAY (last visited Jan. 20,
2003) (calling for women to mail protests to the government), available at
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alters the definition of domestic violence, eliminates the victims
rights to remain in the marital home or to be awarded either
maintenance or custody, and permits the court to order the victim
208
Together these changes
and abuser to undergo counseling.
undermine whatever economic stability the LCWRI proposal could
have provided. The provision allowing a court to require mandatory
joint counseling reinforces the initial power imbalance between the
husband and the wife by implying that the violence against her was
partially her fault. These provisions, taken together, indicate a
decreased willingness on the part of society to recognize social
responsibility for the subordination of women and the role that
violence plays in that subordination. Reliance on the internal
resources of the family, for example through counseling, will work to
209
reinforce the current power relations.
The second promising initiative currently underway relates to
judicial and police training. In 1997, Sakshi, a womens organization,
held a conference for judges and other legal luminaries in Southeast
Asia to focus on the links between violence against women and
gender inequality. It was intended as a first step in creating a
dialogue with the judiciary on gender expectations for women and
210
on how these expectations affect courts decisions. The conference
participants were senior members of the regions judiciary and bar,
whom Sakshi saw as facilitators for gender equality training. These
included several Justices of the Indian Supreme Court and the states
High Courts, leading members of the Indian bar, and their
counterparts from other countries in Southeast Asia. The conference
participants concluded that there was gender bias within the judiciary
www.umiacs.umd.edu/users/sawweb/sawnet/news/8Mar02.html.
208. The Protection from Domestic Violence Bill (India), Govt Bill No. 133
(2001).
209. In December, 2002, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Human
Resource Development finally reported out a bill that makes many of the changes
that the LCWRI recommended in the government bill. See E-mail from Indira Jaisi
Ng, Lawyers Collective, Secretary, and Womens Rights Initiative, Project Director,
to Judith G. Greenberg, Professor of Law, New England School of Law (Dec. 14, 2002,
02:34 EST) (on file with author). The Committees version of the bill reinstates the
courts authority to order that the aggrieved person be awarded a right to remain in
the marital home, extends the bills coverage to those who are living in relations
similar to marriage, and deletes both the provisions for mandatory counseling and
the defense of self-defense that was available to aggressors under the government
bill.
210. See Sakshi, Report: Regional Perspectives on Gender Equality (Jan. 4-5, 1997)
(unpublished pamphlet, on file with author) [hereinafter Sakshi Report]. Founded
in 1992, Sakshi is a violence intervention center in New Delhi that provides training,
counseling, and education about violence against women. For information on
Sakshi visit http://www.mnet.fr/webparticulier/a/aiindex/sakshi.html (last visited
Mar. 19, 2003).
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and that this should be addressed through the education of judges.
The Conference Report states:
Judges, lawyers and activists were unanimous in the view that
gender equality education for the region was necessary. . . .
Training at all levels and as a continuous process was endorsed by
most speakers since most judges and non-judges felt that gender
bias was an attitudinal process, which for the existing judiciary was
212
a process of change rather than a one time information input.

One crucial effect of this conference was to expose a number of
leading judges and members of the bar to the connections between
domestic violence and gender inequality and to convince them that
these were interrelated and important issues for the courts.
With the assistance of some of the judges who attended the Sakshi
conference, the National Judicial Academy in India and several other
organizations have organized a series of colloquia on gender and the
law over the past two years in more than a dozen major cities
throughout India. The goal of these colloquia is to increase the
polices sensitivity to gender issues, including violence against
women.213 Thus, as a result, in recent years, NGOs within India have
begun strenuous efforts at both judicial and police education on the
problem of domestic violence.
Although neither of these initiatives is a quick fix, they have the
potential over time to create significant changes in the way actors in
the criminal justice system view domestic violence. They make it
more likely that judges, police and society will understand the
intertwined gender and power relations that result in domestic
violence and interpret domestic violence laws in light of these
relations. They make it less likely that attention will be diverted to
particular forms of violence which can then be blamed on traditional
culprits.
Their focus on domestic violence as a means of
subordinating women is a crucial step in the process of reducing
familial violence against women a process that was begun with the
passage of the Cruelty and Dowry Death statutes.

211. See Sakshi Report, supra note 212, at 21.
212. Id. at 22.
213. See B RITISH COUNCIL  INDIA, JUDICIAL COLLOQUIA ON GENDER AND L AW: STOP
WOMEN BEING PERSECUTED IN CRIMINAL L AW (last visited Jan. 20, 2003), available at
http://www1.britishcouncil.org/india/india-about-us/india-what-we-do/india-rightsrights-and-society-areas-of-focus-judicial-colloquia.htm. The LCWRI also holds police
trainings lasting three or twelve days. See E-mail from Leena, Womens Rights
Initiative, to Judith G. Greenberg, Professor of Law, New England School of Law
(Dec. 12, 2002, 15:06 EST) (on file with author).
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